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GO WORLD

AUTUMN 1983 NO.33



THE ISHI PRESS



Cho Chikun has reason to look happy: he had just created yet another record by winning the Meijin title for the fourth year in a row.

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The cover: Two *sennin* (mountain sages) play a game of go. Detail of a hand-coloured Japanese wood-block print in the Chinese style dating from the latter part of the 18th century, artist unknown. *Collection of William Pinckard.*

Go World is published by the Ishi Press, Inc.	Yearly subscription rate: ¥4,000 (4 issues by seaimail)
Address subscriptions to: The Ishi Press, Inc.	Price per single issue: ¥1,000
CPO BOX 2126, Tokyo, Japan	Airmail rate: ¥6,000 per year. ¥1,500 per single issue
Editor: John Power	(Discounts are available for bulk orders)
Price for back issues 1 - 24: ¥835@. A set of six issues: ¥4,320; Complete set (1 - 24): ¥15,000	

Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first.

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Cho Defends Meijin Title

Following his triumph in the Kisei title, Cho suffered setbacks in the Judan and Honinbo titles, but he has come good again in the Meijin title. By defeating the challenger, Otake, in short order, Cho has added yet another to his string of records: he is the first player ever to hold the Meijin title for four successive terms.

Cho is proving to be Otake's nemesis in the Meijin title: for the third time Cho has beaten him 4-1. Cho has the advantage of youth and stamina, but still Otake appeared to be in superb form in the Meijin league, which he led from start to finish. Cho, on the other hand, appeared to be in a slump. Apart from the shock of losing the Judan and Honinbo titles in such painful fashion (one through three half-point losses, the other after having led 3-0), there must also have been the accumulated fatigue of playing so many title games in succession.

When the Meijin title match started, Cho's form showed that he had fully recuperated, for he started off with two straight wins. The crucial game of the series was the fourth one. Otake played brilliantly and had a certain win, but he threw it away with a ridiculous blunder late in the game. This meant that instead of evening the series, he was down 1-3. After that Otake seemed to lose his will to fight and he tamely surrendered the series to Cho in the fifth game.

The results:

Game 1 (7, 8 Sept.). Cho (W) won by 1½ points.
Game 2 (20, 21 Sept.). Cho (B) won by resig.
Game 3 (28, 29 Sept.). Otake (B) won by resig.
Game 4 (12, 13 Oct.). Cho (B) won by 1½ points.
Game 5 (19, 20 Oct.). Cho (W) won by resig.

Kato Defends Oza

After his demoralizing loss in the Meijin title Otake was probably in no frame of mind to play another title match. Whether or not that was the reason, Kato had no trouble rebuffing his challenge for the Oza title. That makes it four out of the last five years that Kato has held this title.

Game 1 (27 Oct.). Kato (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (9 Nov.). Kato (B) won by resig.

Rin Becomes Kisei Challenger

Rin's return to top form is continuing, and the

New Year will see a return match between him and Cho. Rin triumphed in the Third Stage of the 8th Kisei, defeating Kiyonari 7-dan and Kato to reach the playoff, in which he defeated Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in 2-0 to become the challenger. This will be Rin's third attempt to take the Kisei title.

Many go fans were hoping to see Shuko make a comeback, but after winning his first game, against Nakamura Hidehito 8-dan, he bowed out against Sonoda. Full results in the Third Stage are given below.

Preliminary round. Sonoda beat Ohira, Otake b. Awaji.

Quarter-finals. Sonoda b. Kataoka, Fujisawa b. Nakamura, Rin b. Kiyonari, Kato b. Otake.

Semifinals. Sonoda b. Fujisawa, Rin b. Kato.

Final. Rin b. Sonoda 2-0.

Kataoka Defends Tengen

Kataoka Satoshi has now clearly established himself as the top player of the post-Cho group by winning the Tengen title for the second year in a row. He is still the only player younger than Cho to have won a major title. For the challenger, Awaji Shuzo, this was a disappointing end to a year in which he had come out of the pack to establish himself as a front-rank player but yet had not quite managed to take a title. The results:

Game 1 (7 Nov.). Kataoka (W) won by ½ point.

Game 2 (16 Nov.). Awaji (W) won by 4½ points.

Game 3 (28 Nov.). Kataoka (W) won by resig.

Game 4 (12 Dec.). Kataoka (B) won by resig.

Kusunoki Wins Women's Honinbo

In the first title match between sisters, Kusunoki Mitsuko 6-dan won the 2nd Women's Honinbo title from her elder sister, Honda Sachiko 6-dan. After splitting the first two games, Kusunoki won the final game (played on 12 October) by half a point to take her first title.

The eldest of the three Honda sisters, Sugiuchi Kazuko, the wife of Sugiuchi 9-dan, made news earlier in the year by becoming the first woman player in go history to win promotion to 8-dan. She achieved this feat on 21 July by defeating Kamimura Haruo 7-dan while holding white.

39th Honinbo League (as of 31st December 1983)

Rank	Name	C	K	T	I	S	T	A	Y	Score
1	Cho	—		0	0		0			0 — 3
2	Kobayashi		—			0		0	0	0 — 3
3	Takemiya	1		—	1		1			3 — 0
4	Iwata	1		0	—		1			2 — 1
5	Sakata		1			—		0	1	2 — 1
5	Takagi	1		0	0		—			1 — 2
5	Awaji		1			1		—	0	2 — 1
5	Yamashiro		1			0		1	—	2 — 1

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

39th Honinbo League: Disastrous Start for Favourites

Without a doubt the current Honinbo league has made the most surprising start ever, with the two favourites both immediately eliminating themselves from contention with three straight losses. Cho and Kobayashi, who between them have dominated the title and the league in the last couple of years, seem to be plummeting out of the league, while former Honinbo Takemiya has surfaced in their place. Takemiya started the ball rolling by defeating Cho in the first round of the league. At the moment he must fancy his chances of making a comeback as challenger, but he is being closely marked by four players on 2-1.

9th Meijin League

The new players in the league are Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan, Takagi Shoichi 9-dan and Kobayashi Satoru 7-dan. The last-mentioned is making his first appearance in a league, but in the only round played so far he had the misfortune to run into Rin. First round results: Kobayashi Koichi beat Kato, Ishida Akira b. Otake, Takagi b. Hashimoto, Rin b. Kobayashi Satoru.

Sakata Reaches Judan Playoff

Sakata Eio, President of the Nihon Ki-in and one of the all-time greats in the history of go, is making a strong bid, at the age of 63, for his first major title in some nine years. Sakata won the final of the winners' section of the 22nd Judan tournament, defeating Kajiwara 9-dan. That, incidentally, put an end to the best run in a tournament that Kajiwara has had for many years.



Takemiya — best start in Honinbo league

Sakata will now meet the winner of the playoff in the losers' section between Cho and Kobayashi Koichi.

Moussa Wins 1983 French Championship

This year's French championship was the largest ever, with 210 players taking part in the four stages of the competition, which was carried out in many different parts of France: Bordeaux, Grenoble, Nantes, Nice, Paris and Strasbourg.

The third stage, an eight-round Swiss with 16 players, decided the two finalists. They were Andre Moussa and Pierre Colmez, who both scored seven wins. They were followed by Charles Mary, Gilles Zemor and Masumi Yoshida, all with five wins.

In the best-of-three final, held in Nice in June, Andre Moussa succeeded in rebuffing the chal-

lenge of Pierre Colmez with two straight wins. He thus won the title of French Champion for the 6th time.

1983 Canadian Open

The 1983 Canadian Open Championship, a six-round Swiss McMahon, was held on Thanksgiving weekend, October 8 and 9, with 52 competitors. Usually the McMahon does not produce a true final, but this year Se Ju Lee and Beck were tied going into the final round, so the winner of their game, Beck, became the Open Champion. As Mr. Beck is not a Canadian citizen, a playoff was held among the 2nd to 5th placegetters to decide the Canadian representative in the WAGC. In this playoff, Se Ju Lee beat Yoon Bae Kim, last year's representative, and Myung C. Shin beat Bruce Amos; the final was then won by Lee.

World Youth Wei-ch'i (Go) Championship

'Go World' has received a letter from The Juridical Person Ing Chang-Ki Wei-ch'i (Go) Educational Foundation concerning its plan to sponsor the World Youth Wei-ch'i (Go) Champion-

ship. This tournament will be held in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China for three days from 14 to 16 July 1984 and is open to players of any strength below 16 years of age. The areas eligible for participation are: Europe, America, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and the Republic of China. Singapore and Hong Kong will each be represented by one player, the Republic of China by six and the other areas by three players each. China Airlines is cooperating in the organization of the tournament. All travel (including round-trip tickets to Taipei), meal and accommodation expenses for the duration of the tournament will be borne by the sponsors.

For further details, contact:

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12th Fl., Kuang Fu Building
No. 320 Chung Hsiao E. Rd.
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Late news on page 35.

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
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38th Honinbo Tournament

Surprisingly, this is the first title match between Rin Kaiho and Cho Chikun, two expatriate go players, each of whom has, for a period, dominated Japanese go. It is also the first title match with no Japanese player participating. The Japanese go press has not made much of this point, however, perhaps for the reason that the Japanese go public is not chauvinistic. Both Rin and Cho are immensely popular in Japan.

Despite their foreign genes, Rin and Cho could be considered products of Japanese go. Cho came to Japan at the age of six to enter the Kitani school and did not make a trip home until after he won the Meijin title. As a result, he is only moderately fluent in Korean, though that does not stand in the way of his being a national hero in Korea. Rin is likewise a hero in Taiwan, where he was discovered by Go Seigen at the age of ten (he played Go on six stones and lost by one point). Rin came to Japan soon after that game. He was, of course, old enough to have mastered his own language, but he also became completely fluent at Japanese. This is a contrast to Go Seigen; he came to Japan when he was fourteen, but he has maintained his Chinese identity in both dress and language (after half a century in Japan he still has a foreign accent).

Rin rose to the top of the go world at almost as youthful an age as Cho — in fact, he was the first young player to win top titles. He became Meijin at the age of 23 (Cho was 24) and became Meijin-Honinbo at 26 (Cho beat him by a year). We have become used to players in their twenties dominating the top titles, but before Rin it was unheard-of. When Rin challenged for the Meijin title, Sakata Eio, then Meijin-Honinbo and aged 45, bluntly asserted that 'a Meijin in his twenties is inconceivable'. He was just voicing the conventional wisdom of the time — technical mastery of go was not considered sufficient to take a title, for it was thought that the all-important positional judgement only developed fully with personal maturity. Sakata had to lose three Meijin title matches in a row before he could bring himself to admit that things might have changed (the margins in Rin's favour were 4-2 in 1965 and 4-1 in 1966 and 1967, which must have helped to persuade Sakata). Now, of course, the 'conventional wisdom' has been completely reversed: only young players are considered to have the stamina necessary to last through the gruelling two-day games of the top three titles, Shuko being the exception that proves the rule.

Rin is a great veteran of title matches, but this one was more important to him than most. For a start, he himself admitted that he was lucky to be the challenger — he could hardly have counted on Kobayashi Koichi to fumble things the way he did when he seemed to have the challengership sewn up (see GW31, page 4), and then Rin won the playoff by half a point. Despite his stature in the go world, Rin had been without a title for five years, since he lost the Meijin title to Otake in 1978. His two challenges for the Kisei title were rebuffed by Shuko, and his 1979 challenge for the Honinbo title, which he held from 1968 to 1970, was dismissed 4-1 by Kato. This match was going to determine whether he was going to fade into middle age (to exaggerate a little) or instead resume his rightful place in the honour roll of title-holders. Past results between Rin and Cho were no guide to the likely result: they were dead even, at 10-10.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei, Meijin & Honinbo

Black: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

Played on 16, 17 May 1983 in Yokohama.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho.

Figure 1 (1 – 37). *Cho's excellent judgement*

Black 15. Essential to prevent White 'a'.

White 16. When Black has the double-wing formation (5 and 9) based on the star-point, invading

immediately at 16 seems to be the best strategy for White.

Black 21. Black 'b' is also possible.

White 22. White 'b' — Black 25 — White 'c' is also possible.

Black 31, expecting White 'd', is a natural forcing move, but I thought that Cho's decision to ignore it was very shrewd. However, Cho did comment that he wished that he had played 32 at 'e' or 37, which would have made miai of playing next at the bottom and on the right side.



Play starts on the first day of the first game. Watching (centre) is Takagawa, Hon. Honinbo, the referee, and on his right are Michael Redmond (game recorder) and Izumitani 6-dan (wearing glasses).






Figure 1 (1 - 37)

Black 33 and 35 are the only moves. If White plays 34 at 1 in Dia. 1, Black can handle the fight after 2 to 6; likewise for the fight in Dia. 2 if White plays 36 at 1 there.


Black 37 is the turning point in the fuseki. Since White has tenukied at the top, Black is tempted to crawl in at 1 in Dia. 3, but if one hypothesizes the continuation to 8, Black then has




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

no severe follow-up attack. Actually this sequence has the drawback of driving White into Black's own moyo. In view of that, attacking from the other side with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 seems to be correct. Black seals White in and can look forward to a

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(per game) loser: ¥350,000

Game fees in preliminary rounds range from ¥39,000 for a shodan in the 1st prelim. round to ¥125,000 for a 9-dan in the second prelim. round. All players in the third prelim. round get a fee of ¥210,000 per game.

* * * * *

sente move at 'a', forcing White 'b'. I did not play this way because I preferred not to be too biased towards a moyo strategy, but actually this was probably the natural strategy considering Black's original sanren-sei.




Figure 2 (38 - 68)

Figure 2 (38 - 68). An uncooperative opponent

White 38. This pincer demonstrated Cho's intelligence: one has to admire his intuitive grasp of the whole-board position. Actually, I had expected him to answer at 1 in Dia. 5, which lets Black get a good, straightforward game with 2 to 6. Even if Black lets White take the right side, exchanging 'a' for White 'b', he has enough territory. This would be an easy fuseki for Black... But my facile optimism was immediately upset: Cho's strategy made it a close game.

The neighboring white positions are strong, so playing forcing moves with 39 and 41 is about the best that Black can do. Black 43, reinforcing

Honinbo Title Winners

1st Honinbo (1941): Sekiyama Riichi 6-dan

2nd (1943): Hashimoto Uтарo 7-dan (won 1-0)

3rd(1945): Iwamoto Kaoru 7-dan (won 3-3, then 2-0)

4th (1947): Iwamoto (defeated Kitani 3-2)

5th (1950): Hashimoto Uтарo 8-dan (won 4-0)

6th (1951): Hashimoto (defeated Sakata 4-3)

7th (1952): Takagawa Kaku 7-dan (won 4-1)

8th (1953): Takagawa (defeated Kitani 4-2)

9th (1954): Takagawa (defeated Sugiuchi 4-2)

10th (1955): Takagawa (defeated Shimamura 4-0)

11th (1956): Takagawa (defeated Shimamura 4-2)

12th(1957): Takagawa (defeated Fujisawa Hosai 4-2)

13th(1958): Takagawa (defeated Sugiuchi 4-2)

14th (1959): Takagawa (defeated Kitani 4-2)

15th (1960): Takagawa (defeated Fujisawa Shuko 4-2)

16th (1961): Sakata Eio 9-dan (won 4-1)

17th (1962): Sakata (defeated Handa Dogen 4-1)

18th (1963): Sakata (defeated Takagawa 4-2)

19th (1964): Sakata (defeated Takagawa 4-0)

20th (1965): Sakata (defeated Yamabe 4-0)

21st (1966): Sakata (defeated Fujisawa Shuko 4-0)

22nd (1967): Sakata (defeated Rin Kaiho 4-1)

23rd (1968): Rin Kaiho 9-dan (won 4-3)

24th (1969): Rin (defeated Kato 4-2)

25th (1970): Rin (defeated Sakata 4-0)

26th (1971): Ishida Yoshio 7-dan (won 4-2)

27th (1972): Ishida (defeated Rin 4-3)

28th (1973): Ishida (defeated Rin 4-0)

29th (1974): Ishida (defeated Takemiya 4-3)

30th (1975): Ishida (defeated Sakata 4-3)

31st (1976): Takemiya Masaki 8-dan (won 4-1)

32nd (1977): Kato Masao 8-dan (won 4-1)

33rd (1978): Kato (defeated Ishida 4-3)

34th (1979): Kato (defeated Rin 4-1)


35th (1980): Takemiya (defeated Kato 4-1)

36th (1981): Cho Chikun (defeated Takemiya 4-2)

37th (1982): Cho (defeated Kobayashi Koichi 4-2)

38th (1983): Rin (defeated Cho 4-3)

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


Dia. 5


the overall thinness of Black's positions, is essential. White 44 next is an excellent point, as the comparison with Dia. 4 makes clear. Black can no longer hope to build a large moyo, so he has to change his strategy and try to compete on territory.

Black 45 is the biggest point. If Black tries a counterattack against 44 with 1 in Dia. 6, White should easily be able to rescue his group after 8. I thought that instead of this Black should aim at cutting with Black 2, White 1, Black 'a'.

White takes sente with 48, then defends against



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

an invasion with 52: this tight, restrained style of playing is typical of Cho. Expanding White's moyo with White 'a' — Black 53 — White 'b' probably would not suit his personality. For his part, Black does not want to invade immediately at 52 with 45, as he has no decent follow-up when White answers at 'a'.

Black 53, White 54. Both sides reinforce their weak positions and dig in for a protracted game. White then reinforces again with 56, a Shuko-style move which filled me with admiration.

Black 57 forestalls the capping move at 69, but I had trouble deciding between this and 1 in Dia. 7. If the latter, White would immediately play his sente moves at 2 and 4. Black 'a' looks strange because it is too close to White's thickness on the left, but being that little bit wider than 1 it makes it harder for White to play 2 and 4. That means that Black might get the chance to hane at 4 himself. Perhaps with 57 I just felt tempted to try something because my opponent seemed so placid, but you could say that later I was punished for the thinness of my play here.

White 58 aims at follow-up punches at 'c' and 63. Black cannot expect to make an effective attack against 58, so capturing a stone with 59 and 61 is probably correct.

White 60. The sealed move. It's unusual for an 'automatic' move like this to be the sealed move.

White 62. I expected White 1 in Dia. 8. My plan was to take sente by sacrificing two stones up to 10. I thought that Black 12 would put me ahead in territory. White has just under 60 points plus komi. Just counting his top and centre territory, Black has 40 points. If you calculate what he could expect to add to that by attacking the solitary white stone on the left side, Black's total easily goes over 70 points.


Unfortunately, Cho was not cooperative. Instead, he made a deep invasion at 62, a move to which finding the answer was very troublesome. Black 65 — White 'd' — Black 'e' would probably

Rin on Cho: 'There are no chinks in his armour. But he immediately finds his opponent's weak points. He invariably thinks carefully about just the points you don't want him to, which shows how sensitive his antennae are to the flow of the game. It's safe to say that you can't expect any careless moves from him.'


'When he is behind, he attacks just where it will cause you the most discomfort, and when he is ahead, he wraps up the game in a flash.'

'He handles the infighting well, his positional judgement is shrewd — there's nothing resembling a weakness in his game. If one had to name a fault, it's a tendency to concentrate too much on profit. The problem is whether the opponent can take advantage of this.'


* * * * *



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

be most solid, but if White later pushes once more at 'f', Black ends up with a disagreeable position whether he defends or tenukies.

Black 63. Black builds up his strength by reinforcing his weak position on the left side and quietly waits to see which way White jumps. At this stage, Black's play indicates that he feels that he is leading. Perhaps sensing this, White launches a powerful attack with 64 and 66. Instead of 64 —

Dia. 9. The conventional approach would be to attach at 1, but Black would be satisfied with 2 to 6. White's centre group is weak, so Black might be able to make a double attack on it and

the white stone on the left side.

White 66. The conventional move this time would be to play a ladder-break at 1 in Dia. 10 (previous page), so that he could capture a stone with 3 to 7. However, the exchange for 2 is terrible and would be too much of a handicap for White. Black would not defend at 'a' next, but would switch to 79 in Figure 3, securing the capture of the white stone.

Black's area at the top was worth less than 20 points to begin with, so Black should be happy to welcome White if he wants to play inside. However, when White actually attached at 68, I vacillated and adopted a compromise strategy.





Figure 3 (69 - 100)

Figure 3 (69 - 100). Missed chances


Black 69. The strongest move is 1 in Dia. 11. The sequence to 7 is inevitable; if next White cuts with 8 and 10, the outcome seems unclear. If White exchanged 'a' for Black 'b' before cutting with 8 and 10, however, I felt that Black could be satisfied with letting White live on a small scale. To continue -

Dia. 12. Black 1 to 5 follow. If White 6 next, Black seals White in with 7, forcing him to link up on valueless points and building black thickness in the centre. Because the marked white stone is weak, there is a strong possibility that Black's thickness will turn into territory.


Perhaps because of my feeling that I was ahead, I gave up on my analysis halfway through and compromised with the exchange (furikawari) from 69 to 77. I thus let slip my first opportunity




Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13




Dia. 14

to decide the game.

Black 75. Black could also play the ko in Dia. 13 (after 17 White makes it a direct ko by giving atari at 'a'), but the sequence in the game is simpler. From the point of view of tewari, Black can be satisfied with the result there.

When White escapes with 78, Black attacks with 79 and 81, and it looks as if he can expect to make some territory in the centre. White 84 was an uncharacteristic slip by Cho. Connecting solidly with 3 in Dia. 14 after peeping at 1 is the proper move. Black extends to 4, whereupon White comes in at 5 to reduce his moyo. The game will turn on how much territory Black makes in the centre. Incidentally, if White plays 5 at 'a', Black attacks strongly with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black 87 was an awful blunder: just on the



Dia. 15

point of sewing the game up, I got flustered. I assumed that White would answer at 89, letting me play at 88 next, but this expectation was immediately betrayed when White calmly answered at 88. Even though Black can cut at 89, White 90 forces him to make pitiful shape with 91. The newspaper reported me as saying, 'I felt terrible every time I looked at this shape', and that's exactly how it was. White easily settles his group with 92 to 96. Instead of 87 —

Dia. 15. Black should have started with the contact play at 1. This way White has to answer 3 at 4, so Black should be able to make a large dent in his bottom area with 5. Linking underneath with 'a' is painful for White, but if he loses the connection, exchanging 'b' for Black 'c' does not secure life for the group.

Figure 4 (101 – 131). *A fatal mistake in timing*

Black 1. Attaching at 'a' would seal off Black's area here; that would give a close game, but Black would have some prospects of winning. However, applying pressure to White with 1 and 3 is also a powerful strategy. It does not succeed only because Black goes wrong with the timing of 5.

Dia. 16. Black should play the blunt sente moves of 1 and 3 before 5. White would have to play 6 and 8. Being able to play Black 7 in sente is big — Black could then switch to Black 27 — White 28 — Black 'b' in the figure and he would be ahead. If White played 6 on the left side in the diagram, he would be unable to live when Black cut off his escape route. After 7 —

Dia. 17. If White tenukies with the marked black stone on the board, Black kills him with the 1–3 combination. Without the marked stone, White cuts with 8 and 10, exploiting Black's shortage of liberties, but this counter-attack is no threat with the marked stone in place.





Figure 4 (101 – 131)

Ko: 20, 23, 26, 29



Dia. 16

Dia. 17

When Black started off by playing 5 in the figure, White calmly answered at 6, after which Black 'c' no longer works. Black has suffered a grave setback due to his mistakes with 87 in Figure 3 and 5 here, and at this stage the game is up for grabs.

Black 7. Attacking White's eye-shape represents a desperate attempt to force White to link up on valueless (dame) points along the lines of Dia. 16. With 8 White refuses to do Black's bidding, and up to 16 a ko results. Actually, however, as I realized later, this was an unimportant ko which I should not even have been fighting. By the time I woke up, though, it was too late. With my preoccupation with the ko, I missed my last chance to try for victory.

Black 21. This ko threat loses points. If instead Black blocks at 27, then White 28, Black 'b', White 'd' follow, giving, with the dormant threat of the ko, a difficult game.





Figure 5 (132 - 190)

Ko: 45, 48, 51, 54

Figure 5 (132 - 190). Anticlimax

Once White blocked at 32, the game looked fairly grim for Black, but he still had one chance to create complications. This was with 43, which must be at 1 in Dia. 18.

Dia. 18. If White 2, Black makes preparations with 3. to 9, then attempts to catch the white group with 11. If White 'a', then Black 'b', White



Dia. 18

'c', Black 'd' — and the fight would be on.

Black 49 creates bad aji by giving White the sente cut at 'a' after he answers at 50. Black has had it.

White 56. Cho had the game won — he was not even in byo-yomi yet (not till 60).

Black resigns after White 190.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 57 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes

('Igo Club', July 1983. Translated by John Power.)



An attempt to look modest by Cho and an unconvincing smile from Rin — mistakes in timing by Rin and an unnecessary ko fight let Cho get off to a good start in the Honinbo series.

Game Two

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Cho Chikun


Played on 25, 26 May 1983 in Hiroshima prefecture. *Commentary by Sakata Eio 9-dan.*

Figure 1 (1 – 32). *Cho's questionable slide*

White 18. If White jumps to 32, Black may make the high enclosure at 'a'. White would then have to play 'b', but already he would have fallen behind slightly.

Black 22. Rin had trouble deciding between this move and the jump at 32.

White 24. The vital point in this shape.



Dia. 1

Black 25. Sliding is doubtful. The usual move is 'c', but Black hesitates to play it because he does not want to be forced. An alternative is Black 1 in Dia. 1. After 2 and 3, Black waits to see what White does. Kajiwara, the public commentator for the game, also roundly objected to Black 25.

Black 29. This is the strongest move. If Black extends at 30, White easily gets a sabaki shape with 32 or 'd'.




Figure 1 (1 – 32)





Figure 2 (33 – 66)

Figure 2 (33 – 66). *Rin falls behind.*

Black 33. If Black hanes at 37, he has only damaged his own position when White plays 50.

Black 39. Drawing back at 1 in Dia. 2 lets White attach at 2 and hane at 4. If Black then gives atari at 'a', Black and White trade captures in the sequence White 'b' – Black 'c' – White 'd'. White probably gains from the exchange since he gets thickness.



Dia. 2

Black 45, White 46. The attachment at 45 is perfectly timed. White wants to pull back at 'a' to strengthen the lower half of his formation, but if he does, Black exchanges 'b' for 'c', gives atari at 47, and captures at 50 when White plays 48. Black can capture because 45 and 'b' establish a ladder block if White plays 49 after Black 50. White must therefore answer at 46 to maintain the ladder, although this means he has been forced to answer submissively.


Black 47. Black could also connect at 'd'.

White 52. A thick move, but a slack one since Black has no move he wants to play here. If he extends at 52, for example, White can throw in at 'd'. White 52 at 53 instead would give White good prospects.


White 54. Defending on the side is also hard to swallow since White's shape is overconcentrated. White should instead defend at 1 in Dia. 3, then launch an attack with 3 and 5 if Black comes in. Building thickness without using it to attack makes little sense.

Black 55. The three-three invasion is ideal. For that matter, it would not be unlike Cho to omit 53 and invade immediately.

White 64. Even though the difference between White 64 and Black 64 is huge, White has to do something more dramatic, such as laying waste to the top with the sequence White 'e' – Black 'f' – White 'g' – Black 'h' – White 'i'.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black 83. Connecting at 84 (followed by White 83 and Black 97) is probably not bad either, but it leaves some bad aji in the corner.

Black 87. Taking this point (White 9 in Dia. 4) clearly establishes Black's lead. Since White 84 is worth 10 points, White has suffered a 10-point loss.

White 92. White has to turn at 93. The hane merely lets Black get sabaki. Uncharacteristically, Rin seems to have lost his desire to carry on the fight.

Black 93 is a headstrong move. Black 96 would be simpler, but Cho has probably completely read out the game sequence.

White 96. White cannot turn at 1 in Dia. 5 because he loses the semeai by one move.

Black 99. Squeezing White with 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 is better. White captures two extra stones, but Black gets sente to take the good point at 5. In the game Black must come back to connect at





Figure 3 (67 – 100)

Figure 3 (67 – 100). A ten-point loss


Black 69. Separating White is severe, but it may be an overplay. Sakata preferred 95.

White 72. White unaccountably misses a golden opportunity. He must peep at 1 in Dia. 4. If Black connects at 3, he can split Black in two with 'a'. If Black answers as in the diagram, White can then capture the two triangled stones. After Black 8 the extension at 9 is worth about 20 points and would put White back in the game.

White 74. Counterattacking, this time at 89, still looks like the best move.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 4 (101 – 145)

9 in the next figure after White 100. Nevertheless, Black's lead is still secure.

Figure 4 (101 – 145). *A last gasp*

White 14. Rin's last attempt to turn the game around comes to nothing as Cho answers calmly.

Figure 5 (146 – 191). *Cho goes two up.*

For the second game in a row Rin got off to a




Figure 5 (146 – 191)

good start, only to stumble later. Missing were those qualities in which Rin excels: tenacity based on deep reading, good positional judgment, and the will to continue despite setbacks.

White resigns after Black 191.

(*'Kido'*, July 1983. Translated by David Thayer.)



Rin writes his sealed move on the game record at the end of the first day's play.

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played on 8, 9 June 1983 at Yunoyama spa in Mie prefecture.

Commentary by Cho Chikun.




Figure 1 (1 - 33)

Figure 1 (1 - 33). The post-joseki key point


White 6. Playing at 'a' is also possible. This is just a matter of personal taste.

Black 9. Kajiwara felt that this move was too slow. He would have preferred to follow Dia. 1, which is more aggressive than seeking immediate life with 9 to 13 in the figure.


Black 15. Pressing with 15 and 17 is a loss for Black territorially, but this can't be helped. If he omits 15 and plays the 19 - 23 exchange, White can play next at 17, building up some influence and taking the pressure off his solitary stone at 8.

White 20. Perhaps I should have made a pincer at 1 in Dia. 2. Black 2 next is natural. This is a very reasonable result, as the marked white stone erases the influence of the kikashi stones Black 15 and 17 in the figure. Instead of 2 in the diagram, Black might consider a second kakari at the top, but the ensuing fight would be a little unreasonable, due to the presence of White 1 and the marked stone.


Black 23. Another possibility is Black 1 in Dia. 3, but a difficult fight follows when White strikes at the vital point of 2. Black 3 and 5 are big, but White 4 and 6 take away Black's base. Having to defend at 7 is painful. Actually, this




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

was how I expected Black to play. The peep at 2 is always the vital point with the joseki in the bottom left corner.

White 26. Jumping once again, to 27, is normal, but I don't like it. In comparison, White 24 is an urgent point: if White lets Black cap at 24, he will have a hard time getting sabaki for 8, but the same is not true of 27. Still, capping at 27 is natural fighting spirit for Black.

White 28. As mentioned before, the vital point. Deciding on his answer is difficult for Black: 'a', 'b' and 'c' are also possible.

White 30. White pokes his head out - this move has an effect on the black group at the top, so Black has to be careful. I planned to play here when I played 26.

Black 31. Having come this far, Black has no choice but to block the escape route of the white

stones, though the weakness of his own wall now becomes exposed. However, pushing through immediately is dangerous for White because of his shortage of liberties.

White 32 not only starts to build a base but also activates the threat of the cut at 'c'. Even if White is sealed in here, he will be satisfied if he can survive, since his moves at 6 and 26 have nipped in the bud any possibility of a black moyo.

Black 33 leaves a weakness in Black's position. Correct is Black 'd' or 'e'.




Figure 2 (34 - 67)

Figure 2 (34 - 67). The game-deciding fight

White 34. Either Rin overlooked this move or he underestimated its severity.

Black 35. Again not to the point: he should block at 36.


Black 37, White 38. With each side cutting the other, it's hard to tell who is the assailant and who is the defender. However, I was confident that the white group could not be captured.

White 40 and 42 are a tesuji combination, inducing Black to play 43 which makes White 44 natural. The latter is sente against the corner, so White is not in as much trouble as he seems to be.


Black 43. Black does not necessarily have to play this move. He could defend the corner immediately with 1 in Dia. 4 (previous page), then attack with 3 and 5, but giving White the ponnuki would be painful.

Black 51 is a crucial mistake: it must be at 'a'. See Dia. 5.

Dia. 5. Later on, when White plays the 2-10



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

combination, Black cannot stop White with 11, as White can capture at least the three marked stones. This problem appears in the game at moves 58 to 67. For details, refer to Dias. 9 to 13. From those diagrams it becomes clear that Black 1 should be one space to the right.

White 52. Of course White gives atari from this side — if at 'b', Black would just sacrifice 47, which would not be interesting for White.

Black 57. Black would like to play 1 to 5 in Dia. 6 as kikashi, then come back and capture the white stones with 7, but of course White won't answer that passively. Instead of White 2 he will counterattack at 'a', and Black will be unable to save the three marked stones.


Black 59. There is no other way to play: extending at 60 would make slack shape.

White 60 — Black 61. Both players misread the situation here, as instead of 61 Black could counter with 1 in Dia. 7 (next page). White 2 and 4 look ominous for Black, but he counters with 5 etc., then, thanks to his sente move at 11, is able to capture White with 13. Since 2 here leads to disaster —

Dia. 8. He might try 2 here, but after 3 he has zero confidence in his position.


Black 61, 63. Black has the same blindspot, which lets White off the hook.

White 66. Simply playing this atekomi is correct style, though many people might be tempted to play White 'b', Black 67, White 66. This looks like a small difference, but it makes a big difference later on. Of course, White has to have worked out that permitting Black to block at 'b' does not matter.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8



Dia. 9





Figure 3 (67 - 100)

Figure 3 (67 - 100). The ramifications of 67


Black 67. If Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 9, White plays the sequence to 12, then finishes Black off by playing kikashis at 1 and 3 in Dia. 10, then pressing at 5. Even if Black plays 6 and 8, he cannot escape.

So, instead of 9 in Dia. 9, Black plays 9 in Dia. 11. This gives White no choice but to capture three stones with 10, whereupon Black can build up influence by catching two white stones himself. White then has to defend at 12. This is not bad for Black.

To go back a bit, the best move for White is to cut at 1 in Dia. 12 instead of 2 in Dia. 9. Black can capture the three cutting stones up to 12, but up to 17 White catches the three pivotal




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

marked stones in sente and also builds thickness by squeezing, in sharp contrast to Dia. 11.

Actually, cutting bluntly with 8 and 10 in Dia. 12 is bad style. Good style calls for Black 8 in Dia. 13. The best that White can do is to connect



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

at 9, followed by 11 to 15 in order to capture the three black stones. The difference from Dia. 12 is that White doesn't get influence and Black gets sente. This sequence seems to be the best for both, but it is hard to say which is better, this diagram or the sequence in the game.

Black 67, a peaceful move which avoids all these complications, allows White to escape without a fight. The continuation to 80 is then natural: White plays kikashis with 68 to 78 before jumping to 80. Black 81 is the best that Black can do, but White 82 makes unconditional life and also threatens to take away the base of the black group above. Black uses the sacrifice of 85 and 91 to link up his two one-eyed groups.

Black 93 is well-timed. If White tries to catch the black stone, he will destroy his own position, as illustrated in Dia. 14. After White 2, Black cuts at 3; White 4 to 8 offer the strongest resistance, but Black wins the semeai after 9. White



Dia. 14

therefore has to defend with 94, leaving Black a big endgame point.

Black 93 and 95 carry Black's plan through to completion. Since he has made the forcing move at 93, Black does not regret the territorial loss at the top.

White 100 was played automatically, as being given atari by Black at 100 is usually bad, but in this case it was risky. After the fight in the centre left, the game was tilting towards White, so his aim should just be to wrap up the game as quickly as possible. White 100 gave Black a chance.





Figure 4 (101 - 150)

Figure 4 (101 - 150). *Black misses his chance.*

Black 1. This was Black's last chance: Black misjudged the situation. Black 1 is big, but he is behind in territory, so he should attack at 1 in Dia. 15 (next page). If White pushes at 'a', Black just extends at 'b', putting even more pressure on the white centre group. The best move for White is simply to flee with 2. What will happen next is unclear, but there is a strong possibility that Black will be able to torment the centre group, thus taking profit on the right side, then switch to 1 in the figure.








Figure 1 (1 - 36)



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Better is playing a keima at 1 in Dia. 2, then defending with 5 after forcing once more with 3. If Black now cuts with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', then White 'd' makes good shape. Note, however, that if White plays 5 in Dia. 2 immediately, omitting 1 and 3, then Black attacks strongly with 2 in Dia. 3. After Black 8, White is in bad trouble. It is not easy to see a way to escape without heavy losses.


Black 27 shows fighting spirit. Following Dia. 4 is just what White wants.

White 30. White 1 in Dia. 5 is an overplay, but if Black carelessly answers at 2, White separates Black with 3 and cannot get a bad result. But if Black plays 2 at 3, White is left with two heavy groups.


White 34. Instead of this move, squeezing with 1 in Dia. 6 looks tempting for White, as-



Dia. 4




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

6: connects



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

5: connects


suming Black answers at 2. The result up to 17 is clearly favourable for White. Note that if White plays 13 at 14, Black makes a placement at 14 and wins the semeai by one move. However, expecting this diagram is optimistic. Instead of 2 -

Dia. 7. Black will simply discard his two stones. He gets a good result up to 6.

Black 35 is a formidable tesuji. If Black simply blocks at 'a', White 35 makes miai of cutting and of playing at 1 in Dia. 6.


White 36. If at 1 in Dia. 8, Black squeezes with 2 and 4, then encircles White with 6. White can live but has to exchange 9 for 10. A professional would rather sacrifice these stones than play such a painful exchange, that is, crawling for life on the edge himself while making it easy for Black to live (White gives Black a half eye at 'a' for free). Instead of 1 -

Dia. 9 (next page). White could try giving atari at 1 (to destroy that half eye), then playing 3 as in Dia. 7, but now Black descends at 4 and the sequence to 10 follows. Note that 10 is more




Dia. 9

8: throw in: 9: captures



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

severe than just giving atari to the three stones, as White would sacrifice them, switching to 'a'. After Black 10 here —

Dia. 10. If White tries to escape with 2, Black first cuts at 3, then connects at 5, threatening to catch White in a ladder. White defends with 6, but then Black 7 puts him on the spot. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 11. If White extends at 2, Black jumps down at 3 (not 6, because then White can jump to 9). To save his group, White has no choice but to play 4 to 8. Black 9 is then a good move. White can cut and capture with 10 and 12, but then Black 13 and 15 cut his position into pieces. Note that Black can capture three stones at any time by giving atari at 'a'.

(The above explanation shows why 36 is necessary but the amount of analysis — these diagrams do not, of course, represent the whole — that went into this innocuous-looking move is staggering. This is typical of the kind of analysis only undertaken by a player actually involved in the game — an onlooker might easily miss the real reasons for playing 36.)

Figure 2 (37 – 84). *Aji in the centre*

Black 43. White of course wants Black 51 so






Figure 2 (37 – 84)

41: connects



Dia. 12



Dia. 13


that he can build a moyo with White 43. Perhaps White should have played 42 at 43.

Black 63. If at 66, White will invade at 'a'.


Black 71 looks unimaginative, but giving this atari cannot be helped. Black 1 in Dia. 12 is usually good style, as it sets up the standard tesuji to 7, but here 'good style' doesn't produce a good result. White gets centre thickness, then settles his corner group with 10, while Black's group still doesn't have secure eye-shape.

White 76. A very composed move. Otake, who was giving a running commentary on the game, had expected 1 in Dia. 13. However, the continuation to 10 gives Black thickness.


Black 77 is not a purely defensive move: it



Dia. 14



Dia. 16



Dia. 15

actually aims to utilize the aji of 69 remaining when White plays 76. Once Black has exchanged 81 for 82, he can aim at pulling out 69, as 81 is a ladder-block. Without 77 on the board, however, White can live in an emergency with the sequence from 1 to 7 in Dia. 14. Note the two sagaris 3 and 7: this kind of shape regularly appears in tsume-go (life-and-death) problems, with the sagari often being preferable to the kaketsugi (diagonal connection).

White 78 guards against an invasion, but it also defends the three stones 68, 72 and 76 in case Black cuts them off by pulling out his stone with 1 in Dia. 15 (assuming Black first makes the 81 – 82 exchange in the figure).

White 84 helps defend against the aji of Black 69 by building up White's centre moyo, but it also aims at the invasion at 'a'. Actually White has no answer to 83: he has no move that will capture the black stone in the corner. For example, if he plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 16, Black easily lives with 4 to 8.

Figure 3 (85 – 136). *The losing move*

White 86. Resisting with 1 in Dia. 17 is impossible as White loses the semeai.

Black 91 is correct. Black would like to extend at 1 in Dia. 18, but White will counter with 2 to 6, threatening to play 'a' next. If Black plays 'a' himself, however, White will invade at 98 in the figure and Black's groups will not survive the fight.

The result to 95 seems, at first sight, good






Figure 3 (85 – 136)



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

for Black, but his ponnuki with 95 faces white thickness and White has 12 points in the corner, so, considering that he tenukied against 83 in Figure 2, White is satisfied.

White 100. If at 115, Black 'a' gets Black out of trouble.

Black 103. A sacrifice to strengthen Black's side position.

White 108 is necessary. If omitted, Black will capture the two stones, not with Black 109 – White 'c' – Black 110, which is gote, but with Black 'c', which is sente against White's corner.

White 114 is a bad move, as the exchange for 115 wipes out all the aji of White 98. Up to this point the game had been going well for White, but now he loses his lead.

Black 131 is the losing move. If Black exchanged 'd' for White 'e', then captured the white stone with 'f', he would win the game by $\frac{1}{2}$ or $1\frac{1}{2}$ points. Rin seizes the chance to play 132 in sente before defending at 134. Black could have played 131 at any time, as White would not play 131 himself for quite a while yet.

White 136. If Black cuts at 'g', White will play at 'h'; if Black first hanes at 'i', White will cut at 'j' and again answer Black 'g' at 'h'.





Figure 4 (137 - 200)



Dia. 19

Figure 4 (137 - 200). *Cho's oversight*

Black 65. The result of a misreading: Black thought that he could capture White by cutting at 1 in Dia. 19 after White 70, but when White counters with 4 etc., Black is the one who is captured. Cho realized this and backtracked with




Figure 5 (201 - 232)

71, but the exchange of 65 for 66 helped White by eliminating some of the bad aji of his weak position here.

Figure 5 (201 - 232). *Rin survives the kadoban.*

Rin was momentarily startled when Black cut at 7, but the exchange to 13 is even. When Cho resigned, he was about 2½ points behind. Rin had kept his chances alive by surviving the first of the four kadobans he had to face.

Black resigns after White 232.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes

(Translated by Rob van Zeijst.)

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played on 29, 30 June 1983 at Hakone.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho.





Figure 1 (1 - 28)

Figure 1 (1 - 28). *Rin's new move*


Black 11 could also be at 1 in Dia. 1, according to Takemiya 9-dan. If White answers at 2, Black can secure a base with 3 and 5. Note that Black cannot follow Dia. 2, for after White 4 he has no follow-up. He can hardly make a diagonal connection with 'a', as it has no effect on the marked white stone.

Black 15. Playing 21, letting White capture the stone with 17, would be the peaceful approach.


Black 17 is a strange move. The joseki move is shown in Dia. 3. Normally White continues with 2 and 4. However, in this case White might play the



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


strong move at 2 in Dia. 4. After 3 and 5, White connects solidly at 6. Black cannot try to create a weakness in White's shape by playing 5 at 6, as White 'a' sets up a ladder. Black therefore has to submit with 5 and 7, but then White 8 becomes a nice move. Moreover, White gets two kikashis at 'b' and 'c'. This result would clearly be bad for Black.

White 18 is correct, even though Black gets another kikashi at 19. After White 20, the 18 – 19 exchange becomes a good one for White because it secures an eye and makes the black stone at 17 heavy. However, Rin was satisfied with the result to 20. White is left with a big move at 'a', but for the time being it will be gote. From the point of view of tewari, White has in effect captured Black with the small move of 1 in Dia. 5 instead of White 2. In turn, of course, Black 2 and 4 would be funny in this position, but then White has not actually played 1 yet.


White 22 is the vital point for attacking the black group. Black 'b' in reply would be too submissive, but if Black tenukies White will either seal him in with White 25 or play a ko with White




Relaxing in the garden of the Kagetsuen Hotel in Hakone before the start of the 5th game (with referee, Okubo 9-dan).



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

'b' to 'f'. That means that Black 23 is the natural counter. The hanekomi at 24 is then essential for continuing the attack. If instead White made a hane at 1 in Dia. 6, Black would make excellent shape with 2. If then White 3, Black would profit from the exchange to 6.




Figure 1 (29 - 76)

Figure 2 (29 - 76). Rin's tesuji combination

Black 29. The normal way to make shape here is to exchange 53 for White 72, then to jump to 'a', but the 53-72 exchange affects the status of the ko mentioned in connection with 22. See Dia. 7.

Dia. 7. If White later starts the ko with 2, 4 and 6, and Black plays a ko threat which White answers, Black can then make the ko a very big one by cutting at 'a'. Without the 'b'-'c' exchange, White will hesitate to start the ko, as he also will have a lot at stake.


White 30. If at 'b', Black will make a pincer at 'c', after which he could aim at 'd'.

White 34. This is the only way that White can attempt to link up, but there is still a lot of aji. At the moment the best that Black can do is to seal White in with the sequence in Dia. 8. However, if Black later gets a stone around the marked stone in Dia. 9, he can live at the top with the sequence to 13. This cuts off a white group and also gives him the sente follow-up in the corner of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 38 is a good point, but playing at 39 or 40 instead would have made the game more open, i.e. with the positions less defined.

Black 47 is a tesuji. White 48 is forced: if he answers at 51, Black will live in the corner with 'e', White 'f', Black 'g' (for a detailed discussion of this move, see Ishida's *Dictionary of Basic Joseki*, Vol. 2, pp. 204 - 206).

White 54 is a strong move; merely answering at 72 would make 53 a kikashi. Black 55 is a stout-



hearted move, typical of Rin. More conventional would be a move at 56 or one space to the left, but Rin's strategy is to make White come in so that he can attack him. In the process, he hopes to make profit elsewhere.

White 56. White cannot let Black play another move in this area.

Black 57 is from the correct side, since the stones 39 to 51 are strong.


Black 63 is a nice kikashi. If White ignores it. Black has a severe follow-up at 1 in Dia. 9a. If White 2, Black takes a lot of profit with 3 and 5, but if White 2 at 'a', White gets bad shape after Black 4, White 'b'. Either result would be very painful for White, so 64 is mandatory.

Black 65 and 67 are a beautiful tesuji combination. One now sees why Black wanted to build centre thickness.


White 70. White would like to play at 1 in Dia. 10, but then Black 2 to 8 would destroy his position. That means that the moves to 76 in the figure are forced.

Figure 3 (77 - 100).


Black 77. If at 1 in Dia. 11, White has the warikomi at 2. Black has no choice but to answer at 3, so White can first play another kikashi with 4, then make an eye in sente with 6. White then breaks through with 8: Black cannot block him because White is threatening to capture the two marked stones. White should not have too much trouble as he still has the threat of the cut at




Dia. 10



Dia. 11




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

7: connects



Dia. 14



Dia. 15




Figure 3 (77 - 107)

'a'. If Black plays 3 at 4, White plays 'b', Black 'c', White 7, Black 'd', then makes two eyes with 'e'.

Black 79. Playing at 80 is not interesting, since this would give White the chance to live. Actually, Black would like to be able to hane at 82; if White defended one line above, Black would connect at 79 and be quite satisfied. However, Rin realized that White would make the strong counter of 2 in Dia. 12, setting up the forcing moves of 4 and 6. White next connects with 8 and 10, then counters Black 11 with the probe at 12. Next —

Dia. 13. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 13, White forces with 2, then connects at 4. Should Black shortsightedly cut with 5 and 7, then White 8 does the trick, as it makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.

If following Dia. 12 is wrong, then what about 1 in Dia. 14? In this case, White first plays kikashi with 2, making an eye, then escapes with 4. Black

does not have much chance of catching the white group, especially since White can cut off some black stones in sente with the sequence 'a' to 'f'. Black 79 in the figure, therefore, is the sharpest move.


Black 83 puts the white stones in damezumari (shortage of liberties) in case White tries to connect as in Dia. 15. This time the same trick as in Dia. 13 does not work: after White 'a', Black 'b' is atari, thanks to the stone at 1.

Black 95. Black is satisfied with having forced White to live in gote. His next target is the white group below.

Black 97. If at 'a', White cannot be stopped after White 'b', Black 99, White 'c'.

White 100 is an efficient move which takes territory while defending. If Black takes his second eye with 'a', White links up with 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'.

Black 107. Black would like to be able to exchange Black 'g' for White 'h', followed by cutting above 102, but White will counter with 2 in Dia. 16 (next page) instead. After 3 to 7, White plays 8, 'generously' letting Black cut at 9. Actually this way White takes a lot of profit, while Black cannot be confident of killing the sur-



Dia. 16

rounded white stones. White has the kikashi of 'a', forcing Black 'b', then he can play 'c', threatening to connect underneath with a ko. On top of that, White has the troublesome move of 'd'. Considering that Cho is a master at shinogi (saving groups in trouble), Rin decided not to play this way.





Figure 4 (108 - 145)

15: connects


Figure 4 (108 - 145). Live and let live.

Black 11 is a stylish move which forces White to play many kikashis in order to live. In doing so, he strengthens Black. After 17, White can cut at 'a', but the only effect would be to strengthen Black further when the latter drew back at 'b'.


Black 25 is a well-read-out move: it is sente against the white group. If instead Black attacks with 1 and 3 in Dia. 17, White seems to be dead, but he has some tricks up his sleeve. He can make one eye in sente with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', so he tries to make a second eye with 4 to 8. If Black persists in trying to kill him with 5 to 9, he seriously weakens his own position, so White counters with 10 to 16, making miai of 'd' and 'e'. Black collapses. However, this diagram makes it only too clear that Black 25 is on the vital



Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

point.


White 26. White cannot put off securing two eyes any longer.

Black 27 is meant to connect the centre group with the lower left corner, but White 28 and 30 in reply form a subtle combination. At first Rin considered for a moment making the placement at 1 in Dia. 18. However, White can answer with 2 to 6, discarding some stones. Black takes profit at the bottom, but 4 and 6 weaken his centre group. Moreover, as Rin realized next, White can pick up some stones with the tesuji shown in Dia. 19.


Black 33 should be at 'c'. That would leave bad aji in the corner (White could at least get a ko if he invaded at the 3-3 point) but the moyo on the right side is more important. After Black 'c' White would not have a good point for invading the side.

With 34, however, White also goes wrong: correct is 1 in Dia. 20. If Black 2, White spoils Black's shape with 3, then makes a base with 5. This leaves Black with such bad aji that he might well choose to play 2 at 5, but then White could live easily by extending up the side.

Black 35 is a strong move. White 36 is the vital point, but after 37 White has no good follow-up. If he just cuts at 1 in Dia. 21, Black is happy to discard three stones in exchange for building up influence with his sente squeeze. This result would be very favourable for Black,



Dia. 20



Dia. 21

so White has to do something more drastic to have a chance. He therefore jumps into the black moyo with 38; however, Black defends patiently with 39, waiting for a chance to attack the rootless white stones.




Figure 5 (146 - 200)

66, 69: ko; 75: connects; 98: ko

Figure 5 (146 - 200). Many a slip . . .


White 46. The honte is 62, but that would be a purely defensive move. Black 'a' would endanger the white group to the right. White 46 extends a helping hand to the floating white group and also aims at the hane at 58.

Black 49. Black 50 would be more solid, but Black is aiming at the group to the right.


White 50 is the vital point, but Black is ready for this move and strikes back with 53 to 57.

Black 59. Black cannot cut at 67 as White answers with White 60, Black 61, White 68. However, Black is able to set up a ko with 63, and he has enough ko threats to win it.

White 70 is not a ko threat, as Black's answer



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

at 71, threatening to cut at 'b', is sente. Either Cho slipped up because of lack of time or he was short of ko threats anyway. Black 75 in effect finishes off the game. White cannot play 76 at 1 in Dia. 22 as he loses the semeai.


White 80 is a frightening move. If Black omits 81, he will meet with destruction, as shown in Dia. 23. White 7 is the trick that puts Black into damezumari.

Note that White could capture some centre stones by cutting at 'c', but that would not be big enough.


Black 89. A mistake in byo-yomi: Rin did not want to block at 95, as White could have got a ko with 'd', but 89 could have lost the game. If Black had just answered at 93 he would have been ahead in the semeai as before.

White 90. When he played this move, the title was, at least for a moment, within Cho's grasp, but his next move was another blunder, returning the honours for 89, and the lead was upset again. Instead of 92 -


Dia. 24. If White extends at 1, he can answer



Dia. 24



Dia. 25



Dia. 26

Black 2 by attacking on the other side with 3 to 9. White would win this semeai. To continue —

Dia. 25. The sequence to 19 finishes Black off.

With 92 the position becomes a ko, but Black has time to connect at 99. If White connected at 95, that is, at 1 in *Dia. 26*, he would lose the semeai.




Figure 6 (201 – 249)

Ko: 4, 7, 10, 13, 16; 18: connects; ko: 19, 22, 25, 28; 30: connects (at 1); 46: ko

Figure 6 (201 – 249). *More byo-yomi slips*

White 20. White 21 would create more ko threats, but it is an unprofessional move, as it loses a handful of points. Cho seems to have overlooked the fact that he could get a ko threat by playing 'a'.

White 28. White should first connect at 29, forcing Black 49 (though he still wouldn't win the ko). After Black 35 and 37, it is all over.

Black 41 should have been at 43, but it makes no difference, as the ko with 42 means nothing. With 49 Black wins the semeai unconditionally: *me-ari me-nashi* (one eye against no eye).

Many top professionals advocate having at least one tournament with no time limits. After seeing this game, this opinion seems quite reasonable, as Black 189 and White 192 were both 'losing moves' made in byo-yomi, not to mention the other slips.

White resigns after Black 249.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes

(Translated by Rob van Zeijst)

Game Six

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 14, 15 July 1983 at Lake Yamanaka, Yamanashi prefecture.

Commentary by Sakata Eio 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1 – 33)


Figure 1 (1 – 33). *A complicated beginning*

Black 3, 5 and 7 form the mini-Chinese fuseki. Of course, White can prevent it if he doesn't like it by playing 6 at 28 (not the low kakari, as that would make Black 7 an ideal pincer).


After Black 7, White 8 is essential, as permitting Black to play on the star-point to the left of 8 would be unbearable.

Black 9. Black could also slow the game down by exchanging 'a' for White 12, then defending at 'b'. This would be a tight way of playing, the strategy being to aim at taking the lower right corner on a large scale by playing at 'c' later.


Black 11. Entering at the 3-3 point is not interesting, as White builds up influence with 2 to 6 in *Dia. 1*, then attacks at 8. This way Black's




Dia. 1




Dia. 7




Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

3: plays in; 4: captures
6: connects




Dia. 6

position becomes too thin.

White 14. Another way of playing is shown in Dia. 2. Black gets a lot of influence, but White takes solid territory. The result is about equal, but maybe Rin didn't like it as Cho's original intention had been to go for outside thickness.

Black 17. Together with the 15-16 exchange, this move virtually immobilizes the white stone. If White hanes, Black extends at 2 in Dia. 3. White tries to break out by dint of brute force with 5 and 7, but Black makes a well-timed kikashi



Dia. 8

with 8, then cuts at 10. The continuation through Dia. 4 to 6 in Dia. 5 is a one-way street.


Next, Black has to defend his cutting points. He can do this by simply connecting at 7 in Dia. 5. If White then tries to break through with 'a', Black does not block at 'b' but drops back at 'c', letting White capture two stones but sealing him in. This would give Black impressive outside thickness.

Instead of 7 in Dia. 5, Black can also defend his cutting point with 1 in Dia. 6. If White then pushes through with 2 to 8, Black calmly defends at 9, even though White can cut at 'a'. Black has good prospects of building up outside strength, then attacking the solitary white stone on the right side.

White 18 makes Dias. 3 to 6 invalid, so defending with Black 19 seems to be the move. Actually Black could also just defend at 21. If White then follows Dias. 3 to 5, Black defends at 1 in Dia. 7. If next White hanes at 2, Black builds up a wall with 5 and 7. In this result, the marked exchange is not bad for Black as there is still some aji that he can aim at.

Perhaps Black was worried that if he played 1 in Dia. 8, White would answer with 2 and 4. However, he can avoid complications by capturing two stones up to 11. This result could not be bad for Black. Instead of 2 -

Dia. 9. (next page). If White hanes at 2, Black no longer follows Dia. 3. After 7, he keeps things simple by defending at 8. White has to add a stone at 9, so Black goes for a large corner with 10. The marked white stone is just about unsaveable.



Dia. 9

Even though White can play 'a' — Black 'b' — White 'c' in sente later on, this result is reasonable.

Black 19 is thus probably not the best move, as White can move out with 'd'.

Evaluating the result to 33 is difficult. White seems to have got the better part of the exchange as he has captured two stones, but the aji of White 10 has been reduced considerably. Black can even attack White's eye-shape with 'e'.





Figure 2 (34 — 75)
67, 70: ko

Figure 2 (34 — 75). Making White strong


Black 43 nips White 'a' in the bud.

White 46 is necessary. If omitted, Black attacks at 1 in Dia. 10 and White has a hard time. If he cuts through with 2 and 4, Black 5 and 7 are a tenacious counter. White 8 is stopped by Black 9, a four-step hane: White cannot capture the key cutting stones. Next —


Dia. 11. The best that White can do is to capture a stone with 1 to 5, followed by cutting at



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

7, but Black defends calmly with 8 and 10. If White persists with 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', Black finally lives with 'f', which means that the white group dies.

White 50. Meant to defend against the aji of Black 55.

Black 55 is bad style. In the sequence to 74, White gets useful thickness without weaknesses. Compare this with the moves in Dia. 12. After the sequence to 9, the best White can do is to play White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f', but he will be left with cutting points in his shape. They might not be an immediate threat, but giving White the massive wall in the game certainly makes it harder for Black to counteract his influence.

Figure 3 (76 — 120). Cho is outwitted.

Black 79 is an awkward move. Usually the 79 — 83 sequence is only played when White has first played at 'a', since without White 'a' there is a lot of aji for Black to exploit. Perhaps Cho expected Rin to defend at 'a' anyway after 83, considering that the black stone still has some aji. The best move for Black here is simply descending at 1 in Dia. 13. White 2 is mandatory, so Black gets the chance to invade at 3. If White 'a' after 5, Black answers at 'b'; if next White 'c' and Black 'd', White's thickness on the left automatically disappears.

White 84, taking advantage of Black's mis-





Figure 3 (76 - 120)



Dia. 13

calculation, is a very shrewd move. With White so thick, Black can forget about invading the top.


Black 85 to 97 are an attempt to build up influence to oppose the white wall on the left. Cutting at 94 instead with 85 would be a mistake, as White makes sabaki with White 'a', Black 85, White 93, Black 86, etc., sacrificing two stones to build up even more influence.

Black 97. Having to take gote to defend means that this manoeuvre has not been a success.


White 98 is an overplay: it should have been at 'b'. However, Black 99 is an unusually inept move for Cho. Instead of letting White live so easily with 100 —

Dia. 14. Black should stir up trouble by crosscutting with 1 and 3. If White plays 4 to keep the position simple, Black swallows up a white stone up to 13. Note that this way Black can still aim at playing at 'a'. If White 'b' after 13, Black reduces his moyo with 'c' and gets a reasonable result.

With Black 101 and White 106, the game is far from easy for Black.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Black 109 shows fighting spirit, but White 110 is a good answer.

Black 111. Black has little choice. If instead Black 1 in Dia. 15, White forces with 2 and 4, then descends at 6. If next Black 'a', White secures the top with 'b' and wins; if instead Black 'c', his group will not survive the attack beginning with White 'a'.

White 112 and 114 are a nice continuation; again Black is forced to answer on the side. White 116 surrounds the top on a large scale, and Black 109 becomes mochikomi, that is, a loss without compensation. This definitely decides the game in White's favour.








Figure 4 (121 - 152)



Dia. 16



Dia. 17


Figure 4 (121 - 152). A reprieve for Rin

White 26. If the hane at 'a', Black 29 would give White a lot of bad aji.


White 30 aims at 'b', so Black defends at 31. White's next move, however, is a bad mistake which throws the game into confusion (Rin was already in byo-yomi). Instead of 32, pushing through with 1 in Dia. 16 is the only move.

Dia. 16. If White 1 and 3, Black has to defend the corner with 4. If White then reinforces at 5, threatening to cut at 'a' next, he has a sure win.


White 34. It is obvious that White still underestimates the gravity of his bad aji at the top. A reinforcement at 'c' is urgently needed. White's successive blunders with 32 and 34 bring on a crisis for him at the top.




Dia. 18



Dia. 19 6: connects



Dia. 20



Dia. 21


Black 41. White is now in bad trouble. Apparently, however, Cho had a simpler way of finishing White off here. Rin commented after the game: 'Instead of 41, Black could have played 1 and 3 in Dia. 17. This combination works: it makes miai of cutting at 'a' and playing the Black 'b' — White 'c' — Black 'd' combination. The game would have been over.'

When White countered with 42 and 44, it was Cho's turn to go wrong. The timing of 45 was wrong.


Dia. 18. Simply extending to 1 is correct. If White connects at 2, Black 3 is sente against White's position to the left, so Black can play 5 and 7. White cannot give atari. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 19. If White 2 (as in the game), Black plays 3 to 7, and White is helpless. Next —

Dia. 20. If White 1, Black plays 2 to 8. If next White 'a' and Black 'b', White cannot give atari at 'c' because of shortage of liberties. Black wins. Instead of 1 —



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

Dia. 21. If White 1 here, Black plays 2 and 4, then after White 5 (White cannot give up his two stones or he loses), Black has the tesuji of 6. White has to lose something.


Playing the 45 – 46 exchange in the figure first was fatal for Black. When he continued with 49, White was able to counter at 50. To show the continuation after 52 –

Dia. 22. Black now loses the semeai. Thanks to

Attacking the Two-Space Enclosure

Continued from page 44

some points at the top, but at the cost of floating stones in the centre. His top right corner is also very thin, so White is satisfied.



Dia. 12

Late News

Cho Wins 1st Kisei Game

In a strange start to the Kisei title match, Cho won the first game thanks to an oversight by Rin, who let slip a chance to kill a large group of Cho's. At that point of the game Rin was ahead, so he did not bother to analyse the status of the group but 'trusted' his opponent – Cho wouldn't leave dead groups lying around, would he? The issue became irrelevant when Rin's group sur-

White 50 in the figure, White is able to give atari after 8 and 10 in the diagram.

To go back a bit, the best continuation for White after 7 in Dia. 19 is White 1 to 7 in Dia. 23. However, Black captures the two stones in sente, so he is able to switch to 8. This upsets White's lead.

Black resigns after White 152.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes

('Igo Club', Sept. 1983. Translated by Rob van Zeijst.)

Rin was treading on thin ice in this game. As in the fifth game, he made a mistake when ahead because of time trouble but was given a reprieve because his opponent was suffering from the same affliction. The last blunder is the one that counts.

The series was now even, but, after his superb (one can't say 'miraculous' anymore, since this is the third such comeback in modern go) fightback, all the momentum was with Rin. The final game was a fitting climax to the series, but as we have run out of space we have to hold it over to our next issue.

Dia. 12. That in turn means that the correct move for Black may be 7 here. White will force with 8, then invade at 10. The sequence to 20 is then one possibility. This is an efficient result for White, so Black cannot claim that his invasion at 1 has been a success.

To recapitulate, Black 1 is certainly a sharp tesuji for attacking the two-space enclosure, but a satisfactory result is by no means guaranteed in every case. It's just as well for Black to know that he has this option, but he has to exercise care in using it.

('Kido', March 1983. Translated by John Power.)

rounding the 'dead' group was cut off and killed itself in a separate semeai.


Kobayashi Wins Losers' Section of Judan

In the playoff of the Losers' Section, played on 16 January, just three days after the Kisei game, Kobayashi Koichi defeated Cho in 153 moves. Uncharacteristically, Cho played a Takemiya-style large moyo game but didn't manage to get a Takemiya-size centre.


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro 7-dan

The three problems below all involve the same elementary tesuji. Anyone of mid-kyu strength should be able to solve them, while dan-level players should get them on sight. If you have any trouble, then this article may be what you need to bring your technique up to scratch.




1. *Black to play (5-kyu)*



2. *White to play (4-kyu)*

Answers on page 39.



3. White to play (2-kyu)


Good and Bad Shape

Magari Reiki 9-dan


3. The obsession with connectivity

‘Not connecting your stones with a solid move is dangerous.’ This seems to be the motto of inexperienced players: they always play moves that link their stones together.


Pattern A (good shape). That's why moves such as this jump out with Black 1 are not likely to occur to them. This move, of course, is good shape and to an experienced player it would be second nature. However —



Pattern A: good shape




Dia. 1: bad shape




Dia. 2

Dia. 1 (bad shape). Some players would play Black 1 here, trying to keep connected while escaping, but it is bad shape. Proving that is simple,



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


but just looking at it should tell you how heavy this shape is.

Dia. 2 (Black's fear). Maybe Black is worried that with the jump to 1 his stones can be separated, but if White plays the degiri (push through and cut) of 2 and 4, Black 5 is double atari. If in effect the stones cannot be cut, that means that they are linked together even after a jump.

Dia. 3 (bamboo joint). If White extends at 2, aiming at the cut, Black makes a bamboo joint with 3 and his group has its head out into the open.

Dia. 4 (solid connection). If White plays the kosumi of 2, Black connects at 3, and it's probably safe to say that these stones will never be captured. Whichever way you look at it, in this shape nobody would fill in one of his own internal liberties by playing a move like 'a'. The fact that 'a' is a point which has remained vacant in both Dia. 3 and 4 should be enough proof that Black 1 is good shape.

Go back and look at Dia. 1. Black 1 has been played on a point where no stone should be – whatever follows is going to be bad for Black. Let's confirm this.



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Dia. 5 (dangerous). White 2 is severe on the bad shape created by Black 1. Black has no choice but to follow the sequence to 7, but then White harries him with 8, placing his group in great danger. (Black can extricate himself with 'a', provided that the ladder is favourable, but because of the relationship with the left side position this is by no means guaranteed. At any rate, once having started with a bad move, discovering a good move later is nothing to be proud of.)

Anyway, seeing how Black 1 and 7 in this diagram overlap, making Black overconcentrated, should demonstrate clearly just how bad this shape is.

This is analysed in the next diagram.


Dia. 6 (tewari). To recap, jumping to Black 1 initially makes good shape. White 2 and Black 3 next are the moves that we saw in Dia. 4. However, when White continues with 4, Black makes the completely unnecessary damezumari move of 5: in effect, he has exchanged this useless move for White 6.

If the exchange of Black 'a' for White 'b' is added, you get the same position as in Dia. 5. It becomes obvious just how bad a move Black 5 is. Wasting a turn at this point, letting White play 6, is unbearable. If you start out with bad shape, your shape will always be bad.

Pattern B

This pattern illustrates the same principle. When attacking enemy stones, it's no good playing safety-first moves. You have to make a conceptual breakthrough, though that's easier said than done.

Pattern B (good shape). Wedging in with Black 1 (a warikomi) is good shape, though it might more properly be classified as a tesuji than as a




Pattern B: good shape

shape move. The aim is to cut White apart. However, if Black were an inexperienced player –


Dia. 1 (bad shape). He might settle the shape with the atari of 1 before playing 3. As in Dia. 1 in Pattern A, Black is nervous if his stones are not actually connected. Little does he realize how bad the exchange of Black 1 for White 2 is for him.

Dia. 2 (no need for alarm). Black is worried that if he plays away from his own stones with 1, White will intercept him with 2.


However, if White does play this way, the cut of Black 3 makes miai of the extension to 'a' and the capture at 'b'. White would have little choice but to capture at 'a', but then Black could be satisfied with capturing two stones with 'b'.




Dia. 1: wrong timing



Dia. 2: safe



Dia. 3: correct order



Dia. 4: success


Dia. 3 (trouble). Because of this, White must answer Black 1 by blocking on the outside at 2. After Black 3, White is forced to connect at 4, but then Black 5 puts him on the spot. Because the extension of Black 'a' is a threat to White,

he has no choice but to jump out and escape with 6.


Dia. 4 (captured). Being unable to make the atari at 1 is painful for White. If Black extends to 2, White is forced to defend at 3. Black 4 is also sente, so Black can then capture White by cutting at 6.

Dia. 5 (a dud). However, playing Black 1 and 3 in this order makes a difference because of provoking White's connection at 2. Now when Black cuts at 7, his plan misfires because White can get a ladder with 8. To explain this further —

Dia. 6 (illogical). In this position, simply cutting at 1 is correct, but Black commits the unpardonable sin of giving atari from the inside



Dia. 5:



Dia. 6: illogical


with 1. The exchange for White 2 makes the cut at 'a' a dud. This shows that bad shape will always lead to a bad result.

Reference Diagram C. The black stones on the lower side are in danger, but they can be brought back to life at one stroke with the hanekomi of Black 1, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. However —


Dia. 1 (suicide). Keeping one's stones connected by playing Black 1 and 3 only helps the opponent to get out of trouble. Black is dead after White 4.

To sum up, a conceptual jump is better than a plodding connection. To be more precise, omit unnecessary stones where possible.

The logic of go values efficiency, so go players see more beauty in the stones that are not played. ('Kido', March 1970. Translated by Louise Bremner.)




Ref. Dia. C




Dia. 1: plodding


Sacrifice Tesuji Problems




1. What is the best sequence for Black?




2. Can Black save his captured group?




3. White to play and save his group.



4. The corner black group only has one eye (gomoku-nakade), but can Black exploit the weaknesses in White's shape?



5. With all the stones he's captured, Black looks safe, but White can kill him.



6. Can you find the skilful sacrifice that enables White to live?


Answers on page 40.

Basic Fighting Techniques

Continued from page 36


Pattern 16: The Two-step Hane

The nidan-bane or two-step hane is an attacking technique with a wide range of uses; it is particularly effective when the opponent is suffering from shortage of liberties (dame-zumari). It leaves cutting points in one's own shape, but it enables one to press an attack home so quickly that the opponent does not have time to exploit one's weaknesses. Gaining a tempo in development is the main theme of this tesuji.



This is a very common shape. Black's next move is mandatory.

Dia. 1. Black must hane at 1. White has no choice but to make a diagonal connection at 2, so Black is able to build thickness on the outside. Playing 1 at 5, letting White crawl at 1, is of course very slack.




Problem One: Black to play

White has just turned at 1. Black cannot capture him, so the problem is how best to fix up his shape.


Dia. 1. Black 1 fails hopelessly when White captures the two stones on the edge. White 2 at 'a' would also be bad for Black. Black 1 at 'b' is not good enough either (White answers at 'c').

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the only move. If White 2, Black gets a good, strong position with 3. If next White 'a', Black reinforces with 'b', and White cannot do anything at the top. On the contrary, Black can aim at attacking the whole white group.


Dia. 3. White 1 is unreasonable, as White cannot



Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 2: unreasonable

pull out his three stones. The result to 6 is a disaster for White.




Problem Two: White to play


At first sight it may seem unlikely, but White can kill Black. The problem is how to stop him from getting an eye in the corner.

Dia. 1. Defending against the cut with 1 fails when Black descends to 2.


Dia. 2. White 1 looks ridiculous, but it takes advantage of Black's shortage of liberties. Even



Dia. 1: timid



Dia. 2: the tesuji




Dia. 3: unavailing

Dia. 4: not enough

though Black captures a stone, White links up on the edge with 3 and 5, leaving Black without an eye in the corner. Instead of 4 –

Dia. 3. Preventing the connection with 1 does not work as Black cannot give atari in the corner.


Dia. 4. If you saw the tesuji, but then followed it up by playing a ko with 3, you only get half marks.




Problem Three: White to play

This position is still unsettled. What is White's best continuation?


Dia. 1. White 1 and 3 are fair enough, but 5 shows a lack of imagination. White may get excellent shape, but doing it in gote is unsatisfactory.




Dia. 1: gote for White



Dia. 2: severe



Dia. 3: sente



Dia. 4: a mistake

factory. White has not exploited the defects in Black's shape.

Dia. 2. The two-step hane is a much more severe idea. After 5 –

Dia. 3. Black can give atari at 6, but then he has to connect at 8. This result is a success for White: he has forced Black to answer submissively and has kept sente. He can leave capturing the black stone till later.

Dia. 4. Capturing the white stone is greedy. When White pushes through with 4 and 6, Black is forced to defend at 7, so White captures the outside stone in a ladder. This result is a setback for Black, but 7 at 'a' would be a disaster.


('Gekkan Go', April 1979. Translated by John Power.)

Sacrifice Tesuji Problems: Answers


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black should begin by sacrificing an extra stone.


Dia. 2. White must play 2, so Black cuts at 3, then –




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 3. Black squeezes in the centre and on the side.


Dia. 4. Cutting at 1 before extending to 3 is a mistake. Black's result is clearly inferior to Dia. 3.

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. Black 1 is a clever move. If 2 –




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 2. Black 3 is an exquisite follow-up: White has no answer. If White 4, Black gives atari at 5 and White cannot capture at 'a' because of shortage of liberties.


Dia. 3. If White connects at 4 here, he is still unable to capture after 5.

Dia. 4. If White captures at 4, Black 5 makes it impossible for White to make an eye with 'a'.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. White 1 may look strange, but it is the starting point for securing life.


Dia. 2. Black will probably play 2 and 4 to prevent White from connecting underneath, but then White plays 5 in sente, then —




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3. White 7 also becomes sente, so White has time to make his second eye with 9.


Dia. 4. Without the sacrifice first, White 1 and 3 are doomed to failure.

Answer to Problem 4: ko


Dia. 1. The sacrifice of 1 is obvious; the timing of 3 is important, however — it must be played immediately.

Dia. 2. Black's follow-up at 7 sets up a ko to capture the white stones.


Dia. 3. Answering at 4 does not help: Black gets the same result with 5 and 7.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Giving atari first at 3 is a mistake, as White can now answer 5 with 6. A mistake in timing lets the tesuji go to waste.


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. White 1 just seems to increase White's losses — how can he hope to kill Black when the latter has captured five black stones?


Dia. 2. When Black captures at 2, White simply plays 3 and the group is dead. The combination of 1 and 3 is easy enough, but how many players would notice it in a game?




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 3. If Black 4, White 5 and vice versa.


Dia. 4. If White starts with the atari at 1, Black has time to secure life by playing 4.

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. White plays 1, then feints as if trying to link underneath with 3. If next Black 'a',



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


White lives with 'b', so Black 4 is the strongest counter.

Dia. 2. After Black 6, White secures one eye with 7 and 9. Actually, the sacrifice of the four stones has ensured a second eye as well.

Dia. 3. To attack the second eye, Black has to play at 'a', but when White answers at 'b', he has to defend at 'c' to prevent White from cap-



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

turing the three stones, so White then lives with 'd'.

Dia. 4. Simply intercepting with 1 is ineffective: after Black 2 and 4, White cannot get the two sente moves he needs to live.

(From a supplement to the April 1980 issue of 'Gekkan Gogaku'. Other problems from this supplement were given in GW21 and GW30.)


Attacking the Two-Space Extension

Kodama Kunio 6-dan

In the fuseki, the two-space extension (niken-biraki) is considered a solid developing move — so solid, in fact, that playing it too early in the game might even slow down one's development. Because it is such a strong formation, it will often be left to fend for itself until well into the middle game. Consequently, one often finds oneself with the opportunity to attack this formation. If one has managed to build up strong positions on both sides of it, a submarine attack inside the enemy formation might be very effective. This article looks at some of the standard techniques for making such an attack. The aim is practical: to show you techniques that you can apply immediately in your own games.


Pattern A. The fuseki has been completed — it's time to start a fight. How should White attack Black's niken-biraki? The point to aim at is obvious.

Dia. 1. With this formation, it's easy for Black to settle himself if White attacks from the outside. In view of Black's positions in the bottom




Pattern A: White to move

left corner and on the right side, it's pointless attacking from above, as White cannot hope to build a centre moyo. That means that White has to think about attacking Black's base. The way to do this is to invade at 1. Black 2 and 4 in reply are



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

commonsense moves, but in the sequence to 5 White not only takes away Black's base but also strengthens and expands his own corner territory. This is a great success for White.

Dia. 2. Consequently, Black will prefer to resist with 2. White of course can extricate his stones, but the thickness Black builds with 2 to 10 weakens White's corner. White cannot be proud of this result.

Dia. 3. If linking up his invading stone as in Dia. 2 does not work well, White has to consider sacrificing it. Doing so with 3 and 5 looks like a reasonable strategy. If Black follows orders with 6, which is the safety-first move, White gets a satisfying squeeze with 7 and 9. Once again White has nicely secured his corner.




Dia. 3

Note that playing Black 4 at 5 would be dubious: Black would face a tough fight when White countered by moving out with 8.

If Black dislikes helping White to solidify his corner like this, then instead of 6 –

Dia. 4. He might try attaching at 6, which is the strongest countermeasure. If White counters with 7 and 9, Black plays 10 to 14. This result leaves White with bad aji, so it cannot be called favourable for him.


If White plays 9 at 10 or 11, Black gets a reasonable result by playing at 'a'.




Dia. 4

There is no doubt that White 1 is a tesuji ('tesuji' can be defined as the best tactical move in a limited position – it is not necessarily the best strategic move), but as the above discussion indicates, whether it is the best move here is open to doubt. The reader should bear in mind that the aim of an article like this is to show him the possibilities in a position, to extend his repertoire, rather than to present sequences for memorization.

Dia. 5. Another option available to Black is to make a diversionary move at 2. If White 3, Black captures the invader at the cost of giving up a stone. White may solidify his corner, but since Black also settles his group, White's manoeuvre with 1 has backfired.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Fighting spirit demands that White counter with 3, in which case the continuation to 13 is probable. Black lays waste to White's corner, but his stones at the centre bottom are cut off, and, on top of that, his moyo on the right side suffers some damage. If anything, this result is favourable for White.

The aim of White 1 may be to rob Black of his base, but White is prepared to switch his strategy in accordance with his opponent's response.


Pattern B. Because of Black's unconventional corner enclosure, the right side is wide open. With Black to play, the natural move is obviously to secure the corner with 'a', in which case White will play 'b'. However, Black may feel that this strategy is a bit too uninspired. If possible, he



Pattern B: Black to play

would like to pick a fight with the white group at the top to give himself time to consider the best way to secure the side. Granted that this approach may be a little greedy, what is the best way for Black to attack at the top? The first problem is to find the right move for attacking this kind of formation.


If both sides are reasonable players, you can't expect a spectacular result even from a tesuji unless the opponent makes a drastic mistake. That means that one has to consider carefully whether the tesuji one has in mind really is the best move in the overall context of the game.




Dia. 7

Dia. 7. Again the placement at 1 is the tesuji. If White 2 and 4, Black gets a good result, taking away White's base and securing his own corner. After the sequence to 11 White has thin positions; an attack by Black at 'a' would place him under considerable pressure.

Dia. 8. The only way for White to maintain his self-respect is to fight back with 2. White's aim is to prevent Black from settling the top right corner with good aji. Here Black tries a




Dia. 8



Dia. 9


sacrifice strategy with 3 and 5, but after the continuation to 12 he has to play 13 if he wants to secure the corner territory. This result is uninspiring for Black, as he has needlessly helped White to strengthen his position (compared to just playing 'a' in pattern B).

Dia. 9. If Black is unhappy with the result of the sacrifice manoeuvre, he could try playing 5 here. However, White 6 is an adequate answer. With 7 and 9, Black merely succeeds in capturing the tail of the lizard, while White can use his newly-built thickness to invade at 10. This result is a setback for Black. Note that Black 7 at 8 works out badly when White counters at 7.



Dia. 10

Dia. 10. Beginning with the attachment at 3 is more interesting. If White 4 and 6, White is faced with a tough fight after Black cuts with 7 and 9. Even if he resists with 10 and 12, Black's perfectly-timed sequence to 17 puts him ahead in the semeai. If White 16 at 17, Black gets a ladder with 'a'. That means that White 6 is unreasonable. White has to try something different.



Dia. 11 13: connects

Dia. 11. Defending his weak point with 6 is correct. If Black 7, White cuts at 8 and squeezes. The continuation to 22 is feasible. Black takes

Continued on page 35.

More Games from the 5th W. A. G. C.

Play-off for 11th Place

Black: Gun-ho Choi (U.S.A.)

White: Pierre Aroutcheff (France)

The U.S.A. has customarily placed someone in the best eight, but this year it was not to be, as Choi suffered defeats at the hands of Imamura and Schlemper. His final opponent, Aroutcheff, is a journalist whose activities include contributions on go to a French games magazine.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Ambitious plans were visible in Black's opening moves at 1 and 3, but Black 9 was questionable. If White had shifted to the right side with 10, Black would have had no effective attack on White 8.

White 18 was misdirected. White should have waited for a chance to slice through Black's thin position at 'a'. He lost a great deal by letting Black strengthen himself at 21 and 23. White should have played 18 at 'b' or 'c'.

Black 25 and 27 should both have been 'd'. Since Black started with a numerical advantage in this quarter of the board, he should not have let White get away with such a large corner. The sequence through 36 left Black 7 and 17 out of focus.

Black 37 and 39 would be considered overly bold in a professional game. A professional might play Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g'.

White 40 should have been one or two lines higher.

Black 41 was submissive: Black should have attacked at 'h'. White now had a chance to get back on target by jumping to 'i', but he missed it by playing 42 and 44.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

The result through 62 left White slightly in





Figure 2 (51 - 100)

the lead, due mainly to Black's submission at 41 in Figure 1.

While Black 63 to 67 were very large, White 68 was relatively small. White could have kept his lead by playing 80 and 82, then extending to 95.

Black 69 was a serious mistake. If White had played 72 at 1 in Dia. 1, Black would have been in great difficulty. Black 73 and 75 were big in that they eliminated this danger.



Dia. 1

White 84 and the following moves were doubtful. By now, the lead had shifted to Black's side, although the game was still close.

Figure 3 (101 - 170)

Black put the game away by getting all the large endgame points through 15. This left him

10 points or so ahead, minus the komi. The fact that the margin of victory eventually widened to over 30 points was due to White's running short of time and making some hasty moves and blunders, such as 34 and 54 in this figure and 82, 104, and 106 in the next.




Figure 3 (101 – 170)




Figure 4 (171 – 239)
99 connects at 80

Figure 4 (171 – 239)

Choi showed originality in the opening and strength in the middle game and endgame, but he needs to sharpen his opening play, while Aroutcheff needs to improve his middle game judgement and endgame technique.

Black wins by 32 ½ points.

Play-off for 13th Place

White: Juan Del Rio Alvarez (Spain)

Black: John Blair (New Zealand)

This game matched a high-school teacher (Blair) against a university student (Alvarez). Since Alvarez reached 4-dan in only three years of go playing, he may be someone to watch in the future.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 5 and 7 were an interesting combination, but Black 9 was extremely doubtful. Black should not have invaded this area at all, and if he did invade, he should have invaded high at 12.

Black 13 and 15 were both serious mistakes, especially 15. The proper way to push out was not with 15 and 17, but with Black 'a', White 21, Black 19. White could have had Black in real trouble by playing 20 at 'b'.

White missed a tesuji at 22. He should have played White 23, followed by Black 'c', White 'd', Black 22, White 'e'.

Next it was White's turn to give Black a chance and Black's turn to miss it. Instead of connecting at 33, if Black had given atari at 'f', forcing White 'g', then captured 32 with 'h', White would have been in a most uncomfortable position. To prevent this, White should have crosscut with 32 at 33, followed by Black 'i', then 32.

After White 42 on the upper side, the normal sequence is for Black to turn at 46, followed by White 'j', Black 43, White 44, Black 'k'. But White picked the wrong time to backtrack at 46. He had to extend to 47. If Black then played 46,

White 'j', Black 'l', White could build thickness with White 'm', Black 'n', White 'o', and wait for a chance to invade the corner at the 3-3 point.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Rescuing the stone in the bottom left corner was more urgent than Black 51. Black could have tried 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. Abandoning this large corner was equivalent to abandoning the game.

The 53-54 exchange was also doubtful. Black should have slid in to 'd'.

After White forced Black at 58, then grabbed a stone with 62 to 66 while Black had to make neutral moves like 61, the game was no longer close. The outcome was decided beyond doubt when White got the last large point at 68.




Figure 3 (101 - 170) Ko: 19

Instead of mending his shape at 81, Black should have played 82. Letting White have the sente move at 82 made Black's prospects still dimmer.

Black's outward thickness ceased to work when White played 100.

Figure 3 (101 - 170)

A few brief comments on the endgame:

White 6 was unnecessary. If White felt insecure, White 12 would have been a better defense.

Before playing 12, White should have exchanged White 13 for Black 16; then he would have ended in sente.

Black should have played 21 at 22, which was worth fifteen points.




Figure 4 (171 - 255)

Ko: 80 (at Δ), 89 (at 77). Ko (at 98 and $\blacktriangle$): 101, 104, 107, 110, 113, 116, 119, 122, 125, 128, 133. 135 connects at 98, 155 at Δ .

Figure 4 (171 - 255)

This game was marked by technical mistakes by Black in the opening and middle game, from which Alvarez gave his opponent no chance to recover in the endgame.

White wins by 22½ points.

Play-off for 15th Place

Black: Carlos Torres (Mexico)

White: Sergio Parimbelli (Italy)

Although this was the first year that Mexico entered the tournament, Torres took home a quite respectable 2-3 record. Parimbelli may have been in a disgruntled mood for this game; the day before, he had emerged from the middle

game with a sure win against Alvarez of Spain (remarkable, considering that he was ranked at 3-kyu and Alvarez at 4-dan), only to spoil it by trying to win a seki.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 8 ignored the presence of White 6. White should have blocked with 8 at 11, followed by Black 9, White 'a', Black 'b', returning to the normal joseki pattern.

An alternative to Black 13 was to descend at 15, which was also big.

White 14 turned into a gift. White should have treated his three stones on the bottom right lightly and shifted to 'c'.

Black made two nice forcing moves at 19 and 21. White would have done better to sacrifice 4 and 8 by turning at 23, instead of connecting at 20. He could have made this sacrifice again, even more effectively, if he had played 1 to 7 in Dia. 1 instead of 22. The loss of two stones would be offset by Black's bad shape.


Black 25 was ideal.

White 26 was unsatisfactory because it approached Black's strong wall. White should have jumped to 'd'.

Black 35 was premature. White 38 robbed it of most of its value.

White 40 was thin.

White would have suffered irretrievable damage if Black had cut with 45 at 'e', capturing seven stones. In this sense, Black 45 was a saving move



Dia. 1

5 beside 2

6 beside 4

for White.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)


Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 56 should have been at 79. This was an extremely important point. Also, blunt though it seems, White should have attacked with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' instead of with the peep at 56.

With 61, Black should have played 79, which was still the key point.

White 66 was ineffective; White could not make up the territory he lost when Black invaded the corner. White should have played 66 at 'd'.

White 70 was dangerous. What if Black descends at 1 in Dia. 2? If White blocks at 'a', Black cuts at 'b'. If White connects at 'b', Black links up at 'a'.



Dia. 2

Although Black missed this opportunity, he still did well by taking the corner in sente through 77, then shifting to the key point at 79.

If White had played 88 at 90, Black would not have had such an easy reply.

Instead of linking at 97, Black should have blocked at 'e'. When White undercut the top right corner, the game became fairly close.

Figure 3 (101 - 195)

Black 11 did not work. Black should have given atari at 12, followed by White 11, Black 49, White 13, Black 16, and a ladder. When White captured Black 9 by extending at 16, Black had no more lead to give away.

Instead of blocking at 25, Black should have

connected at 'a', making White connect at 'b', then pushed forward at 26.

Black 27 was a non-tesuji. The true tesuji was a point to the left, at 29. If White extended at 31, Black could capture two stones with 28.




Figure 3 (101 - 195)

Just when he had pulled even, White lost the game with the hane at 30. If he had jumped to 33, the lead would have been unclear. White could still have stayed in contention by connecting at 41 instead of playing 34, but that was his last chance. Black 43 captured White's group and that was it.

White resigns after Black 195.

Play-off for 17th Place

White: Ping-fai Tsang (Hong Kong)

Black: Sang-Dae Hahn (Australia)

Due to the way the tournament was structured, 17th and 18th place both represented strong finishes. Tsang lost in the first round to Ma, but then reeled off four straight victories in the remaining rounds, while Hahn evened his overall record in the World Championship by winning three and losing two. (He had lost one game in the first tournament in 1979, when first-round losers dropped out.)

Figure 1 (1 - 53)

Both sides played faultlessly through 13.

Although Black 23 was large, 49 was the junction point of the two frameworks, and both Black 23 and White 24 should have been played there.

Black 25 was extremely passive. Black could have done quite well by invading the bottom




Figure 1 (1 - 53)

left corner at 'a' and playing for a trade.

White 26 is a standard attacking move, but in view of Black's strength in the upper left, White would have done better in this game to attack by descending at 'b', followed by Black 'c', White 'd', Black 27, White 28.

Black 33 was correct, but Black 35 and 37 were an overly fancy reply to White's peep at 34. By provoking White 36, Black strengthened White and lost an attachment tesuji at 36 himself. Black should just have connected at 'e'.

White 40 was a leaning attack. Black fought back somewhat recklessly by pushing through and cutting with 47 and 49. He should simply have defended the corner at 53.




Figure 2 (54 - 100)

Figure 2 (54 - 100)

Black's dereliction of duty at 67 was one of

the deciding mistakes of the game. Black had to block at 69. White would cut at 70, and Black could make shape with 86.

When White counterattacked at 68 and succeeded in cutting off four black stones at the bottom through 74, Black suddenly found himself badly behind.

White correctly answered Black 89 by connecting at 90. If he had failed to defend here, then Black 90, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd' would have caused trouble in the corner. White 94 through 100 were also good.




Figure 3 (101 - 164)


Figure 3 (101 - 164)

Black was forced into bad shape with 1 through 9, while White made a good move at 8, defending against the cut at 'a'. Next White shifted to cut through the knight's move at 10, starting another tense fight.

Black could not help answering White 14 and 16 at 17 and 19. If he had played 19 at 20, White would have attacked at the key point at 26, and if Black then turned out at 22, White would live with 'b'.

By blocking at 23, Black created a difficult capturing race. The result through 35 was a seki, but Black drew gote. He could have had sente if he had used 25 to block at 1 in Dia. 1, then continued as shown through 7.

By coming away from the right side with sente to make the attachment at 36, White took a firm grip on the lead. Black made various attempts to turn the tables, first with the attachment at 49, then with the crosscut at 53 and 55,



Dia. 1

but White defended correctly and gave Black no chances.




Figure 4 (165 - 250)

107 at 101. 115 at 81. 116 at 104. ko (at 112 and 81): 118, 121, 124, 127. 131 at ▲

Figure 4 (165 - 250)

Both players showed steady reading ability in this game, and are much stronger than their places would indicate. White in particular played well. It was unfortunate that Black fell behind due to the unwary move at 67 in Figure 2.

Black resigns after White 250.

(Translated by James Davies)

Gambling Go

John Fairbairn

The high intellectual status of go has not stopped it from being a popular form of gambling. Indeed, as long ago as the Asuka period (593–710) there were proscriptions against gambling at go, and there is the celebrated incident in which the Emperor Daigo (reigned 897–930) is said to have gambled for a gold pillow with the priest Kanren.

In Edo times (17th to 19th centuries) there were specialist go gamblers who travelled the country, sometimes making a good living and at other times scraping up enough for the next bottle of sake by repairing go boards. By far the most popular form of gambling go was *me-go* (point go), in which the loser paid the winner according to the size of the victory. Sometimes he paid per point but usually it was in units of ten, with all figures being rounded up to the nearest ten (e.g. a victory by 20½ points was rounded up to 30 and the winner got three times his stake). A unit of ten was called a *ban*, which explains the misplaced term *ichi-ban* in Arthur Smith's *The Game of Go*. In *me-go* it was of course necessary to play the game out to the very end and playing this form of go was said to do wonders for your endgame.

There were various stipulations as to maximum victory and reductions in payment to reflect handicapping, all of which makes the game sound fair, but cheating was rife. Gamblers would go round in twos or threes and when they found a sucker (*kamo*, or duck, in Japanese) those not playing resorted to tricks such as offering a cup of tea at a critical point. This was not the coffee gambit of Western chess, designed merely as a means of upsetting the opponent's concentration. In this case it was part of an elaborate code: the first letter of the phrase uttered indicated the line on the board where the accomplice thought the next move should be. Very often the accomplice was a strong player, sometimes even a player of professional strength, who would be too offputting if he played himself. In the case of really tough opponents this accomplice might hide in the ceiling of an inn and relay the moves to his partner.

There are numerous stories about these gamblers, the favourite type being those where a noble professional disguises himself as a weakie and leads the dastardly villain into a trap where he grinds him into the dust. Here is a slightly different story which I don't think has appeared in English before.

Showdown with Jowa

One day in November 1820, when Genjo and Chitoku reigned supreme, two people called at the Honinbo household and asked for an audience with the head of the family, Genjo. One man was a respectable-looking samurai and the other a merchant. Both were dressed formally in hakama, but a close inspection suggested that these were borrowed clothes.

The samurai was shown into Genjo's room and politely introduced himself and then his companion, Yonezo. He said that they were from Awajishima and had accompanied their feudal lord on a trip to Edo. The lord had heard that Yonezo was a good go player but wanted to know, from the Honinbo, how strong he really was.

In fact Yonezo's name had already long been known in Edo. In company with a gambler called Tokuzo, he had been travelling round the country and was famous as the best player of weakies in all Japan. Although completely self-taught, he was regarded as equivalent to professional 5-dan in strength, and it was obvious to the Honinbos that what he was doing now was not asking to be graded. Rather he was throwing down a challenge to the professionals. And cleverly at that: he had nothing to lose — the Honinbos had a lot to lose but nothing to gain.

But as the request came from a daimyo (feudal lord) it could not be refused. So Genjo acquiesced and told the pair he would let them know the date of the game later on.

When the two men left Genjo scanned the faces of his pupils for an opponent. The senior go player, Sekiyama Sendaiu, wouldn't believe Yonezo was a strong 5-dan, and one of the household, Toyama Sansetsu, who had lived in Kyoto and seen Yonezo there, was equally dismissive, saying, 'Yonezo has

no style at all.'

The only player Genjo felt would take the challenge seriously and still be good enough was Jowa, his heir. Jowa was then 33 and had become heir only the year before. He was officially ranked as 7-dan, but there was a feeling that he was really 8-dan.


The game between Jowa and Yonezo was played at the end of that month, and, as Genjo had expected, Jowa won convincingly, giving two stones.

Yonezo brushed off his defeat as simply a trial game and asked for a 3-dan diploma. Genjo replied, 'Judging by that game with Jowa, you haven't reached 3-dan yet.' This angered Yonezo, who had obviously been boasting to his lord, and he demanded, through the lord once again, a match with Jowa. A ten-game match was therefore arranged (the above game counting as the first game).

Jowa won this match (giving two stones) 5-4 with one tie. Yonezo acknowledged Jowa's superiority and in return was allowed to become a pupil of the Honinbos, even though he was over 50. He was given his 3-dan diploma and was later promoted to 4-dan (in 1824).

Yonezo went to settle in Osaka but before he died, at the age of 66, he confessed that he had not believed anyone could give him two stones. Where have we heard that kind of story before?

Here is the first game between Jowa and Yonezo. Jowa won by nine points. Segoe recommended amateurs not to study Jowa's games, by the way. He said they were too difficult, mainly because of the way he could rescue lost causes.



Jowa v. Yonezo, Jubango – Game One

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

50: connects

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Yonezo showed his aggressive intentions at once when he ignored White 7 and took the initiative by attacking with 8, even though the taisha, which was then a new opening, was very popular. But strategically the idea is unsound – White can confidently expect to get outside thickness on the left side because of his taisha stones.

But at least Black 18 justifies Black's play strategically. It is unsound for it loses the corner, yet it does create the influence Black needs to make sense of his play. It is a typical gambler's




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

move (or perhaps Yonezo didn't know or didn't trust the josekis).

Black 32 is the wrong direction of play and should be the cap one point below 33 ("don't make territory around thickness").

White 37 is typical of Jowa's overpowering play.

Black 42 is too thin: he should extend once more before jumping.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

After Black 64 Yonezo has a reasonable game if he can exploit his aji. White 75 is an attempt to settle some of this aji. And it succeeds because Black 80 is a very amateurish move (it should be at 90, to keep the aji in Black's favour).




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 92 is another cheeky, gambler's move. It made Jowa angry (it should be at 96). The difference between the professional and the amateur approach is already evident.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 30 is crude, but by now Black is desperate. By the time he plays 41 White has clawed back the handicap. Winning is now a formality for a player of Jowa's strength. Black spends the rest of the game chasing shadows, but he does well to keep his loss down to ichi-ban.

Figure 4 (151 - 200), Figure 5 (201 - 266)

White wins by 9 points.

Ed.'s note. Two other Jowa games are given in Chapters Five and Six of *Appreciating Famous Games*.




Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Ko: 77, 80




Figure 5 (201 - 266)

66: ko. Black wins and connects the ko.

The Windlass Ko

John Fairbairn

The triple ko at Honnoji Temple is famous in Japanese go history. It was supposedly played in 1582 between Nikkai (later to become Honinbo Sansa) and Kashio Rigen, but only the early moves are known and not one of the three kos is shown (see GW6, page 45).

But in Chinese history there is an example of a quadruple ko - the full game is shown on the next page




Figure 1 (1 – 65)
White: Seng Kuan-ju
Black: Ku Shen-yin




Figure 3 (131 – 200)
74: connects (at 69); 76: takes 73; 92: takes (at 44); 95: takes (at 89); 98: takes (at 44)




Figure 2 (66 – 130)
109: connects (at 102)




Figure 4 (201 – 255)
4: ko (left of 1); 6: connects (at 1)

— between Ku Shen-yin (black) and Seng Kuan-ju. Chinese books never give dates, but it is known that Seng played several handicap games with the great master Shih Hsiang-hsia, who flourished around 1735 – 40. Shih is reckoned to be one of the top three or four players in Chinese history and he gave Seng two or three stones. Only 11 of Seng's games remain. Ku, who seem to have been an aristocrat, was slightly weaker than Seng. He left two games for posterity — this is one.

It is known as the windlass game, the windlass referring to the windlass on a well, and the raising and lowering of the bucket symbolizing the fluctuating ko fight. In ancient texts multiple ko fights were called 'windlasses of the golden well', an extension of the term 'golden well balustrade' (see GW28, page 63).

Note that the game starts, under old Chinese rules, with stones at the four corner star-points. The outcome is, of course, a draw, even under Chinese rules.

1983 China-Japan Go Exchange

This year saw the twelfth in the series of annual goodwill matches between China and Japan begun in 1973. After the spectacular success of the Chinese touring team in Japan last year, which scored 43 wins to 13 losses, the Japanese side took no chances. Usually the touring teams are a mixture of veteran players and promising low-ranked players who are making the tour for the experience, but this year the Japanese selected four 9-dans and four 8-dans, six of whom have appeared in title matches or played in the Honinbo or Meijin league (these being the main criteria for a top-flight player). The team captain, Ishida Yoshio, was so confident that he predicted at a press conference before leaving Japan that the team would win at least 40 out of its 56 games, which would equal the record of the 1973 team.

The Chinese side read the newspaper report and took countermeasures. Instead of the usual spread of 30 or so local players, they limited the pool for their teams to 19 of their top players, including their four world amateur champions. The result was a victory for the Japanese, but not on the scale that they had expected. They scored 31 wins to 25 losses, just one win more than the 1981 team lead by Hashimoto Shoji, which included a 2-dan and a 4-dan. The outstanding performers on the Japanese side were Kobayashi Koichi, who won all his games (as did Hashimoto in 1981) and Sonoda Yuichi, who scored 6-1. On the Chinese side, Nieh Wei-p'ing made a big contribution to upsetting Ishida's prediction by handing him two losses, though he himself lost to Kobayashi Koichi. The most encouraging development for the Chinese side was the discovery of another prodigy, the sixteen year old Ch'ien Yu-p'ing, who defeated Yamashiro, Hasegawa and Sato.

Judging by the results of this tour, the top Chinese players are still just a little below the level of the top Japanese players, the difference being, in terms of komi, two or three points. Nieh himself agrees with this assessment and comments that in his opinion it will take the Chinese another ten years to draw even. However, the series did show that the Chinese are beginning to build up strength in depth. In particular, in recent years their teenaged players have done very well against the younger Japanese players. This reflects the success of a nation-wide program to find and train talented children. Also, the Chinese instituted a professional system two years ago (though to date they have only created ten professionals) and recently have begun to increase the number of local tournaments. An interesting feature of the dan system is that there is no distinction between professional and amateur ranks, and in fact many of the top players, such as Ma, are amateurs. Professional players are expected to devote themselves to teaching and spreading go as well as playing in tournaments. The ten professionals are:

Player	14 June	16 June	19 June	23 June	25 June	29 June	1 July	Score
Ishida 9	Nieh 9 Lost	Tsao 7 Won	Shao 7 Won	Ch'eng Lost	Ma Won	Nieh Lost	Wu Won	4 - 3
Ishii 9	Tsao 7 Won	Nieh 9 Lost	K'ung Won	Chiang Won	Wang C. 5 Lost	Tsao Won	Shao Lost	4 - 3
Kobayashi 9	Shao 7 Won	Ma 8 Won	Liu Won	Shao Won	Tsao Won	Chiang Won	Nieh Won	7 - 0
Sonoda 9	Ma 8 Won	Wang 8 Won	Lo 7 Won	Ma Lost	Sung Won	Liu Won	Hua Won	6 - 1
Sato 8	Hua 8 Won	Chiang Lost	Ma Lost	Sung Lost	K'ung Lost	Wu Won	Ch'ien Lost	2 - 5
Nakamura 8	Liu 7 Lost	Ch'eng 6 Lost	Hsu 6 Lost	Hua Won	Ch'en Lost	Shao Lost	Ma Lost	1 - 6
Yamashiro 8	Chiang 6 Lost	Shao Won	Ch'ien 5 Lost	Liu Won	Wu 9 Won	Wang 8 Lost	Tsao Won	4 - 3
Hasegawa 8	Huang 7 Lost	Sung 5 Won	Nieh Lost	Ch'en 5 Lost	Ch'ien Lost	Wang Y. 5 Won	Wang C. 5 Won	3 - 4
Result	4 - 4	5 - 3	4 - 4	4 - 4	4 - 4	5 - 3	5 - 3	31 - 25

Note : dan ranks are given on first mention of a player.

9-dan: Nieh Wei-p'ing, Ch'en Tsu-te, Wu Sung-sheng

8-dan: Wang Ju-nan, Hua I-kang

7-dan: Ch'en Kuo-sun, Lo Chien-wen, Huang Te-hsun, K'ung Shang-ming (Nieh's wife)

5-dan: Ho Hsiao-jen

In addition to the above professionals, there are the following high-ranked amateur players: Ma 8-dan, Shao Chen-chung 7-dan, Liu Hsiao-kuang 7-dan and Tsao Ta-yuan 7-dan. Besides these, there are 38 5- and 6-dans, which makes a total of 51 high-ranked players. There are about 80 or 90 players 4-dan or below, but in China the serious ranks begin at 5-dan. Local go organizations can make promotions up to 4-dan, but only the Chinese Weiqi Association can make promotions above that level. Initially ranks were assigned on the basis of past performances, but a Japanese-style rating tournament, played in May and October, has been instituted. The main difference from Japanese go is that there are no tournaments with prizemoney yet — Chinese professionals are on salaries (about equivalent to those of university lecturers).

In GW10 we published a detailed history of postwar go exchange between Japan and China up to 1978. Before going on to our coverage of this year's tour, we would like to bring that up to date. The details of subsequent tours are as follows:

1979: Okubo Ichigen 9-dan team toured China. Results: 22 wins, 21 losses, 5 jigos.

Team of ten Chinese school children toured Japan, scored 26 wins to 4 losses against teams of Japanese elementary and middle school children (including inseis).

1980: Chinese team (including Nieh) toured Japan, scored 32–24 (full report in GW21).

Chinese high school team toured Japan, won 28–0 (Japanese teams amateurs only).

1981: Hashimoto Shoji team toured China, won 30–26 (Hashimoto 7–0, Kataoka and Miyazawa 5–2).

1982: Chinese team (including Nieh and Ma) toured Japan, won 43–13 (full report in GW29).

Kobayashi v. Ma

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Black: Ma Xiaochun 8-dan

Time: 3 hours each. Played on 16 June 1983 at the Peking Sports Hall.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.

(Note: Games were played under Chinese rules, but game records are given here Japanese style.)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 15. Putting aside the question of whether it's good or bad, this is a severe move.

Black 19. If at 26, White will jump into the 3-3 point at 'a'.

White 24. If at 'b', the overall position becomes fixed and the upper right corner becomes secure black territory, which would be unbearable for White.

Black 29. With the jump to 'c' also being possible, this is the kind of point one has trouble making up one's mind about, but Ma played 29 immediately. This move and Black 15 filled me with admiration for his decisiveness.

Black 37. If at 38, Dia. 1 results. This would also be a reasonable game, but White has plenty of eye-shape.






Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 39. The only move: if omitted, White 'd' is ominous. The sequence in Dia. 2 would be very painful for Black, but if he resists with 2 in Dia. 3, his corner position collapses. But if Black had a stone at 'a', he would win the semeai.


Black 45. I think this move is questionable. White erases Black's moyo in sente up to 57 in Figure 2. This makes the game favourable for



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

White, but if you ask me where Black should have played 45, answering is not so easy. Should he jump to 'e' perhaps? This might be the part of the game that shows a player's real strength.





Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)


Black 59. The conventional strategy is Black 'a', White 'b', Black 75, but Black must have felt that he would just gradually fall behind that way, so he threatened White with 59.

White 60. I should have played at 75, the reason being that Black 71 is enormous. When I played 60, I planned to counter 71 by peeping at 'c', then attaching at 'd', but this was thoughtless. White 60 could well have lost me the game. Black 71 puts Black ahead in territory.

White 70. White should still have forestalled



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Black 71 with 1 in Dia. 4.

Black 75. Black neglected to exchange Black 80 for White 'e' first, which would have strengthened his eye-shape. As a result, he was subjected to a severe counterattack by White. The ferocity of that attack perhaps took him by surprise.

Black 81. Black should have followed Dia. 5, linking up along the edge with 3 and 5. That would have made the game promising for him. After 84 Black does not have two eyes. In making this attempt to capture Black, White is closing his eyes to his own thinness in the centre.




Figure 3 (101 - 128)

Ko: 11, 14, 17

Figure 3 (101 - 128)

White 6. Getting a ko here gives White the lead. Black does not have enough ko threats, so he has to ignore White 18.

Black 27. Black would like to capture two stones with Black 28, but then White 'a' would kill the top right corner group.





Figure 4 (129 - 150)



Dia. 6

Figure 4 (129 - 150)

Black 29 ensures connection — if White tries to intercept with 1 in Dia. 6, Black refutes him with 2 to 6.

Black 31. Black must resist the temptation to connect at 35 — White 'a' would endanger the corner.

White 34. At this point I felt that I had the game won — even on the board White is ahead — but my opponent didn't make it easy for me.


White 40. White should have connected at 1 in Dia. 7. Black dies in the sequence to 11. I made the weak-kneed move at 40 because I got worried about the bad aji of Black 10 at 'a'.

Black 41. The fate of Black's group will decide the game.


Figure 5 (151 - 190)

Black 61. An all-out move aiming at setting up a ladder. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 8, he falls into the trap.

Black 67. Hoping against hope: Black is aiming



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Figure 5 (151 - 190)

at the white group below.

Black 89. Black would normally block at 'a', but then White could get an eye in the corner with 'b'; he is assured of another eye in the centre, so his group is safe.

Black resigns after White 190.

(*'Kido'*, September 1983).

Kobayashi v. Shao

White: Shao Chen-chung 7-dan

Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Played on 14 June 1983 in Peking.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.

Figure 1 (1 - 47)

White 18. I was astonished by this new move. Shao spent no time on it, which shows that he must have researched it beforehand. One slip and I would have been crushed, so I spent thirty minutes on my answer, a lot of time considering that the time allowance was only three hours.






Figure 1 (1 - 47)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

The previous joseki was jumping down to 1 in Dia. 1 (after exchanging 20 for 21 in the figure). The joseki continues to 23. The variation in Dia. 2 came up in the final game of my Honinbo match with Cho last year. (See GW29, page 40.)


Black 19. The only move. The continuation seems inevitable.

Black 27. Black can't cut at 44 because of the ladder with White 29, but if White plays 28 at 'a', the cut is possible. There seem to be no other possibilities for the moves up to 33. With 33 one is tempted to cut at 1 in Dia. 3, but the fight after 6 looks bad.


White 34 is necessary after Black 33. If at 1 in Dia. 4, the cut at 2 becomes feasible. White's cut at 9 is less of a threat than the cut in Dia. 3: Black can attach at 12 and neither of his groups seems in danger. That means that White collapses.

White 36. White has little choice: cutting at 'b' is out of the question.


Black 37. The vital point. If Black imprudently plays 1 in Dia. 5, White gains by playing 2. Now that he is alive, White 'a' becomes a threat,




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


while Black's corner is shaky.

The result to 44 looks equal. I was relieved to have ridden out the storm after White's new move at 18. Note that Black has to resist the temptation to give atari at 1 in Dia. 6 with 43. These three white stones look like key stones, but White will discard them in favour of developing rapidly with 2 to 6.

Black 45 is risky, but I could not find anything better. There was a danger of White's invading at 'c' or 'd', but in that case I was resolved to fight.

White 46 is big in itself and also aims at cutting at 'b' (it's a ladder block). Black 47 defends the cutting point while also putting pressure on the white group to the right. I also considered Black 1 in Dia. 7 (next page). If White 'a', Black gets a loose ladder (yurumi shicho) with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. However, since Black 1 does not affect the white group to the right, White can switch to the invasion at 2.

White's next move is slack.



Dia. 7





Figure 2 (48 - 100)


Figure 2 (48 - 100)

White 48 is too tight. Even after 47 White should play aggressively, invading the right side. White 1 in Dia. 8 would make it a very close game. If Black 2, White 3 looks like good shape. Black must then attack with 4. This is the fighting approach for White, compared with letting Black get a comfortable position with 49. White 48 and his next move at 50 show that Shao was making an optimistic appraisal of the position – presumably he felt that the result in the bottom right corner was favourable for him.


White 50. I expected White to press at 'a', in which case I would probably have crawled at 'b'. Shao commented that he did not like the prospect of a counterattack with Black 'c', White



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

'd', Black 50.

White 54. Back to the fuseki: White is staking the game on his left side moyo. The wide extension to 55 instead of 54 would make it easy for Black to come in at 60.


White 56. Just as good in even games as in handicap go.

Black 57, 59. Standard sabaki technique. Shao plays all-out with 60 and 62. The usual move is 1 in Dia. 9 (with 60), but Black lives easily with 2 to 6. Actually the result here is too good for Black, so White would switch to Dia. 10, but Black's group looks safe enough after 6.


Black 63, 65. Crude but effective – 'normal' professional technique would be to make the hane at 1 in Dia. 11, but the result after 2 and 4 is unsatisfactory. When White presses at 6, Black cannot live comfortably. To get life he will have to play 'a' and 'b', moves which will help to make White thick. White 'c' would then be a severe invasion.

White 68. White has no answer to 67: he can't play at 69 or 80.


Black 71 settles the game. Being unable to cut at 'e' is painful for White.




Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

White 76. White should crawl at 1 in Dia. 12. I intended to avoid complications by answering at 2. White could next cut at 3, then attempt to erase Black's moyo with 7. Black would still be ahead, but White would have more of a chance this way.

White 80. If omitted, a ko is unavoidable after Black 1 in Dia. 13. White 2 at 6 or 6 at 7 still gives a ko.

Black 83. Black really should counterattack at 84.

Black 89. It's time to eliminate the aji of the ko in Dia. 14. Note, however, that this is not a gift ko for White, as he would suffer considerable damage if he lost it.

White 90, 92. White's last fling. Unfortunately for him, Black can afford to let him live.

White 100. White could live unconditionally by playing at 'f'.

Figure 3 (101 – 149)

Black 9. This ko increases Black's lead. He need not try unduly hard to win the ko: the successive moves at 31 and 35 are enough.

White 40. Getting life for the group is no problem: White 1 in Dia. 15 will do the trick. However, Black will then invade the left side at 2; if White 3, Black counters with 4 etc. and the four white stones below seem doomed. White would like to have a stone at 'a' in this diagram: that's why he plays 40 in the figure. His group dies when Black connects at 41, but actually White is just looking for a place to resign.

White resigns after Black 149.

('Let's Go', October 1983)





Figure 3 (101 – 149)

Ko: 15, 18, 27, 30



Dia. 15



Shao



Kobayashi

In his first two games, Kobayashi had disposed of two world amateur champions. In the fifth match he beat the 1982 champion, Tsao, then met the fourth Chinese world champion in the last match of the tour. Like Kobayashi, Nieh was

undefeated, having beaten Ishida (twice), Ishii Kunio and Hasegawa, so this game was going to determine who took the individual honours for the tour.

Kobayashi v. Nieh

White: Nieh Wei-p'ing 9-dan

Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Played on 1 July 1983 in Shanghai.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 40 surprised me. I think that White 'a' is correct.

White 50. Surely an overplay. This kind of move might work against the younger Chinese




Figure 2 (51 - 100) 55: connects




Figure 3 (101 - 155)

players, but ...

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White captures a stone up to 60, but Black gets thickness; on top of that, he gets sente. Black goes into the lead with his successful invasion at 61.

White 68. Playing a ko with 'a' would be unreasonable: Black has too many ko threats at the top.

White 78. White plunges in because he is behind, but with 80 he should jump to 99, aiming at defending the left side and attaching at 'b'.

Black 85. I got nervous and played a safety-first move. This should be at 'c'.

Figure 3 (101 - 155)

White 10 is the losing move. White is trying




Figure 4 (156 - 221) 98: ko

too hard — White 11 instead looks right.

Black eliminates the threat of the ko and aims at 'a'.

Black 29. This decides the game. Black now has 60 points to White's 50.

Figure 4 (156 – 221)

White 108 should be at 'a': Black 115 kills the centre group. Of course, the fact that Nieh deserted the centre group probably indicates that he was setting the scene for resigning.

White resigns after Black 221.

(Yomiuri Newspaper)

Nakamura v. Shao

White: Shao Chen-chung 7-dan

Black: Nakamura Hidehito 8-dan

Played on 29 June 1983 in Shanghai.

Nakamura Hidehito had a dismal tour, only managing to pick up one win. In Japan he has won the P.M.'s cup (1978). As this game shows, he did not really play so badly.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 28. Black secures a large territory with 29 and 31, so White should have prevented it by leading out 22. Black next lives with a nicely-timed sequence in the bottom left corner and takes a definite lead in territory.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 63 should be at 75: 63 leaves a watari at 'a', so Black has to reinforce at 65. However, he is still leading.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 146)

32: ko; 34: connects

Figure 3 (101 – 146)

White 20 is an overplay. If Black had connected at 24 with 31, White would have been in trouble, as he would not be able to escape with either 'a' or 'b' (though there is a ko). That would have settled the issue. Through his thoughtless play, Nakamura let slip a good game.

Black resigns after White 146.

The final game we are presenting is between Ishida Yoshio and a 6-dan. A Chinese official apologised for matching a mere 6-dan against the Japanese team captain by pointing out that despite his low rank Ch'eng Hsiao-liu had become

the challenger for the New Physical Education Cup (played in November and sponsored by the New Physical Education magazine, which accounts for the name) and had just missed out on taking the title, losing 2-3 to Nieh. This cup, incidentally, is one of two tournaments receiving sponsorship, the other being the National Champion Tournament, sponsored by the People's Publishing House (played in July and August). In addition, there are two national championships (one for individuals and one for teams) organized by the China Weiqi Association (played in April and October) and the spring and autumn rating tournaments.

Ch'eng, aged 34, is an employee of the Peking Physical Education Movement Committee.

Ishida v. Ch'eng

White: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Black: Ch'eng Hsiao-liu 6-dan

Played on 23 June 1983 in Hangchou.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 55 could have lost the game, according to Ishida. Black should play at 78, aiming at separating the white groups on the right side and at the bottom. White builds a large centre territory and takes the lead.

Figure 3 (101 - 133)

White 12 is the losing move. White cannot win after the exchange for 13. For 12 White should follow Dia. 1, in which he gets sente. In the




Figure 2 (51 - 100)





Figure 3 (101 - 133)



Dia. 1

figure Black gets sente and so can take the large point of 33. Moreover, 'a' and 'b' are miai for him at the top. This is quite a contrast.

Moves 134 to 236 omitted. Black wins by 5½ points. (Yomiuri Newspaper)

(Translated by John Power)

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
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